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men lose an average of 1.4 years of pre-displacement earnings if displaced in mass-layoff events that
occur when the national unemployment rate is below 6 percent. They lose a staggering 2.8 years of
pre-displacement earnings if displaced when the unemployment rate exceeds 8 percent. These results
reflect discounting at a 5% annual rate over 20 years after displacement. We also document large cyclical
movements in the incidence of job loss and job displacement and present evidence on how worker
anxieties about job loss, wage cuts and job opportunities respond to contemporaneous economic conditions.
Finally, we confront leading models of unemployment fluctuations with evidence on the present value
earnings losses associated with job displacement.  The model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) extended
to include search on the job generates present value losses only one-fourth as large as observed losses.
Moreover, present value losses in the model vary little with aggregate conditions at the time of displacement,
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1.  Introduction 
Major economic downturns bring large increases in permanent layoffs among workers 
with high prior tenure on the job.  We refer to this type of job loss event as a displacement.  
Previous research shows that job displacements lead to large and persistent earnings losses for 
the affected workers.
1 The available evidence also indicates that job displacement leads to less 
stability  in  earnings  and  employment,  worse  health  outcomes,  higher  mortality,  lower 
achievements by children, and other unwelcome consequences.
2 
We  develop  new  evidence  on  the  cumulative  earnings  losses  associated  with  job 
displacement and the role of labor market conditions at the time of displacement.  In present 
value terms, men lose an average of 1.4 years of pre-displacement earnings if displaced in mass-
layoff events that occur when the national unemployment rate is below 6 percent.  They lose a 
staggering  2.8  years  of  pre-displacement  earnings  if  displaced  when  the  unemployment  rate 
exceeds 8 percent. These results reflect discounting at a 5% annual rate over 20 years after 
displacement. We also document large cyclical movements in the incidence of job loss and job 
displacement, and we investigate how worker anxieties about job loss, wage cuts and other labor 
market prospects respond to contemporaneous economic conditions. Finally, we confront leading 
models  of  unemployment  fluctuations  in  the  tradition  of  work  by  Peter  Diamond,  Dale 
Mortensen  and  Christopher  Pissarides  with  evidence  on  the  present  value  earnings  losses 
associated with job displacement. 
Our study builds on three major areas of research: empirical work on cyclical fluctuations 
in job destruction, job loss and unemployment; empirical work on earnings losses and other 
outcomes associated with job displacement; and theoretical work on search and matching models 
of unemployment fluctuations along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).  In terms of a 
broad effort to bring together these areas of research, the closest antecedent to our study is Hall 
(1995).  In terms of its effort to confront equilibrium search and matching models with evidence 
on the earnings losses associated with job displacement, the closest prior work is Den Haan, 
Ramey and Watson (2000).   
Our empirical investigation of the earnings losses associated with job displacement draws 
heavily on recent research by von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011).  They develop new 
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1 See, for example, Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993), Couch and Placzek (2010) and von Wachter, Song, and 
Manchester (2011). 
2 We review the evidence and provide citations to the relevant literature in Section 4. See also Wachter (2010). 	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evidence  on  the  short-  and  long-term  earnings  effects  of  job  loss  using  longitudinal  Social 
Security records covering U.S. workers for a period of more than 30 years. Drawing on their 
estimated empirical models, our first main contribution is to characterize how present value 
earnings  losses  due  to  job  displacement  vary  with  business  cycle  conditions  at  the  time  of 
displacement.  For men with 3 or more years of prior tenure who lose jobs in mass-layoff events 
at larger firms, job displacement reduces the present value of future earnings by 12 percent in an 
average year.  The present value losses are high in all years, but they rise steeply with the 
unemployment rate in the year of displacement.  Present value losses for displacements that 
occur in recessions are nearly twice as large as for displacements in expansions.  The entire 
future path of earnings losses is much higher for displacements that occur in recessions.  In short, 
the present value earnings losses associated with job displacement are very large, and they are 
highly sensitive to labor market conditions at the time of displacement. 
Drawing on data from the General Social Survey and Gallup polling, we examine the 
relationship of anxieties about job loss, wage cuts, ease of job finding and other labor market 
prospects  to  actual  labor  market  conditions.    The  available  evidence  indicates  that  cyclical 
fluctuations  in  worker  perceptions  and  anxieties  track  actual  labor  market  conditions  rather 
closely, and that they respond quickly to deteriorations in the economic outlook.  Gallup data, in 
particular, show a tremendous increase in worker anxieties about labor market prospects after the 
peak of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009.  They also show a recent return to the same high 
levels of anxiety.  These data suggest that fears about job loss and other negative labor market 
outcomes are themselves a significant and costly aspect of economic downturns for a broad 
segment  of  the  population.  These  findings  also  imply  that  workers  are  well  aware  of  and 
concerned about the costly nature of job loss, especially in recessions.  
Our  second  main  contribution  is  to  analyze  whether  leading  theoretical  models  of 
unemployment fluctuations can account for our evidence on the magnitude and cyclicality of 
present value earnings losses associated with job displacement.  Following Hall and Milgrom 
(2008), we consider three variants of the basic Mortensen-Pissarides model analyzed by Shimer 
(2005) and many others.  We also consider a richer model of Burgess and Turon (2010) that 
introduces search on the job and replacement hiring into the model of Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1994).    The  richer  model  generates  worker  flows  apart  from  job  flows,  heterogeneity  in 	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productivity and match surplus values, and recessionary spikes in job destruction, job loss and 
unemployment inflows of the sort we see in the data.  
The search and matching models we consider do not account for our evidence on the 
present value earnings losses associated with job displacement. The empirical losses are an order 
of magnitude larger than those implied by basic versions of the Mortensen-Pissarides model.  
Wage rigidity of the form considered by Hall and Milgrom (2008) greatly improves the model’s 
ability to explain aggregate unemployment fluctuations, but it does not bring the model closer to 
evidence on the earnings losses associated with displacement.  The model of Burgess and Turon 
(2010) generates larger present value losses, because most job-losing workers in the model do 
not  immediately  recover  pre-displacement  wage  levels  upon  re-employment.  Instead, 
unemployed persons tend to flow into jobs on the lower rungs of the wage distribution and move 
up the distribution over time. Yet, when calibrated for consistency with U.S. unemployment 
flows, the model of Burgess and Turon yields present value earnings losses due to job loss less 
than one-fourth as large as the empirical losses.  Moreover, present value losses in the model 
vary little with aggregate conditions at the time of displacement, unlike the pattern in the data.    
Present  value  income  losses  associated  with  job  loss  are  even  smaller  in  the  search 
models we consider.  Indeed, a fundamental weakness of these models is their implication that 
job loss is a rather inconsequential event from the perspective of individual welfare.  In this 
sense, and despite many virtues and attractions, this class of models fails to address a central 
reason that job loss, unemployment and recessions attract so much attention and concern from 
economists, policymakers and others. For the same reason, care should be taken in using this 
class of models to form conclusions about the welfare effects of shocks and government policies. 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  evidence  on  the  incidence  of  job 
destruction,  layoffs,  unemployment  inflows  and  job  displacement  over  the  business  cycle. 
Section 3 first summarizes previous research on the short- and long-term consequences of job 
displacements for earnings. It then draws on work by von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011) 
to estimate near-term and present value earnings losses associated with job displacement, and to 
investigate how the losses vary with conditions at displacement. Section 4 reviews previous work 
on  non-monetary  costs  of  displacement  and  presents  evidence  on  cyclical  fluctuations  in 
perceptions  and  anxieties  related  to  labor  market  prospects.    Section  5  considers  selected 	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equilibrium  search  and  matching  models  of  unemployment  fluctuations  and  evaluates  their 
implications for the earnings and income losses associated with job loss. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  The Incidence of Job Loss and Job Displacement over Time 
Figure 1 displays four time series that draw on distinct sources of data and pertain to 
different concepts of job loss.   The job destruction measure captures gross employment losses 
summed  over  shrinking  and  closing  establishments  in  the  Business  Employment  Dynamics 
(BED) database.
3  The layoff measure reflects data on employer-initiated separations, as reported 
by employers in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and as aggregated and extended 
back to 1990 by Davis et al. (2011).
4  We calculate unemployment inflow rates using monthly 
Current Population Survey (CPS) data on the number of employed persons and the number 
unemployed less than 5 weeks.  Summing over months yields the quarterly rates.  The measure 
of initial unemployment insurance (UI) claims is the quarterly sum of weekly new claims for 
unemployment insurance benefits, expressed as a percent of nonfarm payroll employment.  
Figure  1  highlights  two  key  points.    First,  the  sheer  volume  of  job  loss  and 
unemployment incidence is enormous – in good economic times and bad.  For example, the 
JOLTS-based  layoff  rate  in  Figure  1  averages  7  percent  per  quarter  from  1990  to  2011.  
Multiplying this figure by nonfarm payroll employment in 2011 yields about 9 million layoffs 
per quarter. Quarterly averages for job destruction and unemployment inflows are of similar 
magnitude.  Initial UI claims average about 5 million per quarter. In short, the U.S. economy 
routinely accommodates huge numbers of lost jobs and unemployment spells.   
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3 The BED contains longitudinally linked records for all businesses covered by state unemployment insurance 
agencies – virtually a census of nonfarm private business establishments. 
4 To deal with weaknesses in the JOLTS sample design, Davis et al. (2011) rely on BED data to track the cross-
sectional distribution of establishment-level growth rates over time.   They combine micro data from the BED and 
JOLTS to obtain the layoff series in Figure 1.  To extend the layoff series back in time before the advent of JOLTS, 
they use the BED to construct synthetic JOLTS-like layoff rates.  Davis et al. (2010) discuss sample design issues in 
the JOLTS and develop the adjustment methodology implemented by Davis et al. (2011). 	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Figure 1. Layoffs, Unemployment Inflows, Job Destruction, and Initial Claims for 




Notes to Figure 1: 
1.  All series are seasonally adjusted and expressed as a percent of employment.  Shaded regions 
indicate NBER-dated recessions. 
2.  Job destruction rates in the private sector from the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) 
program, as tabulated directly from establishment-level data by Davis, Faberman and 
Haltiwanger (2011) for 1990Q2 to 2010Q2 and spliced to published BED data for 2010Q3 
and 2010Q4.  The splice is based on overlapping data from 2006Q1 to 2010Q2. 
3.  Quarterly layoff rates based on the layoff concept in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover 
Survey (JOLTS), as constructed from establishment-level data from 2001Q3 to 2010Q2 and 
extended back to 1990Q2 by Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2011).  From 2010Q3 to 
2011Q2, we sum the monthly layoff rate published by the JOLTS program and splice to the 
quarterly layoff rates in earlier years.  The splice is based on overlapping data from 2006Q1 
to 2010Q2.  
4.  Unemployment inflow rates calculated from Current Population Survey (CPS) data as 
number of short-term unemployed (less than 5 weeks) divided by civilian employment.  We 
calculate monthly inflow rates in the CPS data and sum over months to obtain quarterly 
inflow rates.  To adjust for the 1994 CPS redesign, we divide the number of short-term 
unemployed by 1.1 prior to 1994.  See Polivka and Miller (1998) and Shimer (2007) on the 
CPS redesign. 
5.  Initial UI claims are quarterly sums of weekly new claims for unemployment insurance 
benefits, expressed as a percent of nonfarm payroll employment in the Current Employment 
Statistics.  Weekly new claims data are available at 
www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp. We sum weekly claims in the month, rescale the 
sum to represent 4 and 1/3 weeks worth of claims, and divide by CES employment in the 
month.  We then sum over months to obtain a quarterly series.  	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Many, perhaps most, of these job loss events involve little financial loss or other hardship 
for individuals and families.  Indeed, the high rates shown in Figure 1 reflect an impressive 
capacity  for  constant  renewal  and  productivity-enhancing  reallocation  of  jobs,  workers  and 
capital in the U.S. economy.
5  It is important to keep this point in mind when interpreting the 
evidence  on  the  costs  associated  with  job  displacement.    That  evidence  focuses,  quite 
deliberately, on the types of job loss events that often involve serious consequences for workers 
and their families.  
Second, all four series in Figure 1 exhibit strongly countercyclical movements, with clear 
spikes in the three recessions covered by our sample period.
6  For example, the quarterly layoff 
rate rises by 129 basis points from 1990Q2 to 1991Q1, 85 basis points from 2000Q2 to 2001Q4, 
and 208 basis points from 2007Q3 to 2009Q1. Interestingly, each measure in Figure 1 starts to 
rise  before  the  onset  of  a  recession  (as  dated  by  the  NBER)  and  turns  down  before  the 
resumption  of  an  expansion.    This  pattern  confirms  the  well-known  usefulness  of  initial  UI 
claims as a leading indicator for business cycles, and it suggests that other job loss indicators 
behave similarly in this respect.
7 
  Much of our study examines the earnings losses of high-tenure workers who lose jobs in 
large-scale layoff events.  To quantify those losses, we follow individual workers over time using 
annual earnings records maintained by the Social Security Administration (SSA).  Figure 2 plots 
an annual job displacement measure for men constructed from the SSA data and compares it to 
annual measures of job destruction and initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits.
8   
Here, we report displacement rates in the population of male employees 50 years or younger with 
at least 3 years of prior job tenure, excluding government workers and certain service sectors not 
covered by the Social Security system throughout our full sample period.   
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5 See Bartlesman and Doms (2000) and Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000) for reviews of the evidence on 
reallocation and productivity growth.   
6 This pattern holds in earlier postwar U.S. recessions as well.  See, for example, Blanchard and Diamond (1989), 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006) and Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009). 
7 As an example, the Conference Board uses new claims for unemployment insurance benefits in constructing its 
“Leading Economic Index.”  See www.conference-board.org/data/bcicountry.cfm?cid=1.  
8 We cumulate weekly UI claims over twelve months in Figure 2 but the calculations otherwise follow the same 
approach as in Figure 1.  The job destruction series in Figure 2 rely on data from Business Dynamics Statistics 
(BDS) program at the Bureau of the Census.  They are available at an annual frequency and extend farther back in 
time than the BED-based job destruction series in Figure 1, but they are not as timely.  Because the BDS-based 
destruction series reflects 12-month changes in establishment-level employment, it is not directly comparable to the 
BED-based job destruction series based on 3-month changes.  	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We regard a worker as displaced in year y if he separates from his employer in y, and the 
employer experiences a mass-layoff event in y.  We say a worker “separates” from an employer 
in year y when he has earnings with the employer in y-1 but not in y.
  To qualify as a mass-layoff 
event in year y, the employer must meet the following criteria: (i) 50 or more employees in y-2; 
(ii) employment contracts by 30% to 99% from y-2 to y; (iii) employment in y-2 is no more than 
130% of employment in y-3; (iv) employment in y+1 is less than 90% of employment in y-2.  
The 99% cutoff in condition (ii) ensures that we do not capture spurious firm deaths due to 
broken longitudinal links. Conditions (iii) and (iv) exclude temporary fluctuations in firm-level 
employment.  While these criteria miss some displacements of high-tenure workers at larger 
employers,  they  help  ensure  that  the  separations  we  identify  as  job  displacement  events  are 
indeed the result of permanent layoffs.
9  To qualify as a job displacement event in y, we also 
require that the separation be from the worker’s main job, defined as the one that accounts for the 
highest share of his earnings in y-2.  For additional details on the data, sample, and measurement 
procedures, see von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011), hereafter VSM. 
To express job displacements in year y as a rate in Figure 2, we divide by the number of 
male workers 50 or younger in y-2 with at least 3 years of job tenure at firms with 50 or more 
employees in the industries covered by Social Security throughout our sample period.  These 
workers comprise 31 to 36 percent of all male workers 50 or younger in industries continuously 
covered by the SSA from 1980 to 2008, depending on year, 40 to 48 percent when we also 
restrict attention to those with 3 or more years of job tenure, and 70 to 74 percent when we 
further restrict to firms with 50 or more employees.  
The  annual  frequency  of  the  measures  in  Figure  2  somewhat  obscures  the  timing  of 
cyclical movements, but the broad patterns echo those in Figure 1: job loss rates move in a 
countercyclical manner, and recessions involve notable jumps in job loss.  The deep recession in 
the early 1980s involves dramatic increases in rates of job destruction and job displacement.  For 
example, the annual job destruction rate at firms with 50 or more employees rose from 11.6% in 
1979 to 18.3% in 1983.  To be clear, the latter figure reflects establishment-level employment 
contractions that occur from March 1982 to March 1983.   Our measure of the job displacement 
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9 Tabulations in Davis et al. (2006) based on BED and JOLTS data indicate that most employment reductions are 
achieved through layoffs when firms contract by 30% or more.   	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rate rose from 1.9% in 1980 to 5.0% in 1983.
10  More generally, the job displacement rate is 
roughly 20 to 25 percent as large as annual job destruction rates, although it is worth stressing 
that the two measures pertain to different at-risk populations. 
 
Figure 2. Job Displacement, Job Destruction, and Initial Claims for Unemployment 




1.  Job destruction rates for the nonfarm private sector are from the Business Dynamics 
Statistics program at the U.S. Census Bureau.  They are tabulated from March-to-March 
employment changes summed over all contracting establishments in the Longitudinal 
Business Database.   Available at www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/bds_database_list. 
2.  Job destruction rates for larger firms reflect establishment-level employment changes for 
firms with at least 50 employees, computed as an average of current and previous-year 
employment. 
3.  Initial UI Claims are annual sums of weekly new claims for unemployment insurance 
benefits, expressed as a percent of employment.  Its construction parallels that of the 
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10 The very high rates of Initial UI Claims in the early 1980s should be interpreted with caution. Temporary layoffs 
were a major phenomenon in the early 1980s, unlike in later recessions, and many temporarily laid off workers 
qualified for unemployment insurance benefits. Since few temporary layoff spells last more than a full year, and 
given that our mass-layoff definition excludes temporary firm-level fluctuations, temporary layoffs play little role in 
our job displacement measure.  For similar reasons, temporary layoffs have little impact on the annual job 
destruction measures. 	 ﾠ 9	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quarterly Initial UI Claims series in Figure 1, except that the monthly rates are summed 
from April of the previous year through March of the indicated year.  
4.  [Right Axis] Job displacement is the rate of job loss in mass-layoff events among male 
workers 50 years or younger with at least 3 years of prior job tenure, expressed as a 
percent of all male employees 50 or younger with at least 3 years of tenure at firms with 
at least 50 employees in the same age range.  
5.  A mass-layoff event is one in which a firm with at least 50 employees (prior to the event) 
experiences a lasting employment decline of at least 30% over two years.  Mass layoffs 
include employment contractions up to 99%, but exclude instances in which the 
Employer Identification Number (EIN) disappears. See the text for further discussion. By 
a “lasting” decline from, say, y-2 to y, we mean one in which EIN employment at y+1 is 
no more than 90 percent of employment of its employment at y-2.  Similarly, we require 
that EIN employment grow by no more than 30% from y-3 to y-2.     
6.  The displacement rate is calculated using administrative data from W2 earnings records 
as in von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011) and described in the text. 
   
  The incidence of job displacement might seem modest in any given year, but it cumulates 
to a large number during severe downturns.  For example, summing the job displacement rates in 
Figure 2 from 1980 to 1985 yields a cumulative displacement rate of more than 20%.
11  This 
figure translates to about 2.7 million job displacement events over the six-year period among 
men 50 years or younger with 3 or more years of prior job tenure, and working in industries with 
continuous SSA coverage. This figure is conservative, given our restrictive criteria for mass-
layoff events. According to the Displaced Worker Supplement to the CPS, 6.9 million persons 
with at least 3 years of prior tenure lost jobs due to layoffs from 2007 to 2009 (BLS, 2011).  This 
figure includes women and does not impose our mass-layoff criteria.  BLS also reports that an 
additional 8.5 million persons were displaced in 2007-2009 from jobs held less than 3 years.  
Figure 3 shows displacement rates for men with 3-5 years of prior job tenure and with 6 
or more years. We impose the same requirements for age, firm size, industry coverage, and 
mass-layoff events as before.  Displacement rates are considerably higher for those with 3-5 
years of tenure and more cyclically sensitive in the relatively shallow recessions of the early 
1990s and early 2002.  These patterns conform to the view that workers with lower job tenure 
face  greater  exposure  to  negative  firm-specific  and  aggregate  shocks.    Figure  4  shows 
displacement rates for men in three broad age groups.  The basic pattern is clear: younger men 
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11 In calculating this figure, we allow the at-risk population to change from year to year.  For some purposes, it is 
more appropriate to consider the cumulative displacement rate for a fixed at-risk population.  Consider, for example, 
the population of male workers younger than 50 with 3 or more years of job tenure at firms with at least 50 
employees as of 1979, and working in industries with continuous SSA coverage.  16% of this fixed population 
experienced a job displacement event from 1980 to 1985 by our criteria. 	 ﾠ 10	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tend  to  be  more  exposed  to  negative  firm-specific  and  aggregate  shocks  that  lead  to  job 
destruction.    
 
Figure 3: Annual Displacement Rates in Mass-Layoff Events by Prior Job Tenure, Men 50 




Notes to Figure 3: See notes 4, 5 and 6 to Figure 2. 
 
Putting Figures 3 and 4 together, higher job tenure and greater labor market experience 
afford some insulation from the vicissitudes of firm-level employment fluctuations. However, it 
is well worth noting that greater job tenure and experience provide less insulation in the deep 
aggregate downturn in the early 1980s.  This aspect of Figures 4 and 5 suggests that severe 
recessions bite especially deeply into the distribution of valuable employment relationships.  
Evidence below on the cyclical behavior of the earnings losses associated with job loss supports 
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Figure 4: Annual Displacement Rates in Mass-Layoff Events by Age Group, Men at Firms 




Notes to Figure 4: See notes 4, 5 and 6 to Figure 2. 
 
3.  The Long-Term Earnings Effects of Job Displacement 
a.  Previous Research 
A growing body of research finds that job displacements lead to large, persistent earnings 
losses.  Most studies estimate the causal effect as the earnings change before and after job loss 
relative to the contemporaneous earnings change of comparable workers who did not lose jobs. 
Studies differ somewhat in how they measure job loss and how they define the control group of 
non-displaced workers.   
Following earlier research, VSM define job displacement as the separation of a “stable” 
worker  from  his  main  employer  during  a  period  when  the  employer  experiences  a  lasting 
employment  decline  of  at  least  30%.    A  stable  worker  is  one  with  at  least  three  years  of 
consecutive earnings at the firm prior to the displacement event.  VSM also require the employer 
to have at least 50 employees in the baseline period before the mass layoff.  They exclude 
workers in 2-digit industries not covered by SSA in the early 1980s, chiefly the public sector. 	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
VSM compare the evolution of annual earnings for displaced workers with that of a control 
group of similar workers who did not separate in the displacement year or the next two years.  
They find that displacements in the early 1980s led to average annual earnings losses relative to 
the  control  group  of  more  than  30%  of  pre-displacement  annual  earnings.    Despite  some 
recovery over time, even after 20 years the earnings of displaced workers remain 15-20% below 
the level implied by control group earnings. 
The short- to medium-run effects of job displacement are larger in depressed areas and 
sectors.  For  example,  using  information  on  earnings  and  employers  from  unemployment 
insurance  records  and  a  comparable  definition  of  job  displacement,  Jacobson,  Lalonde,  and 
Sullivan (1993) [henceforth JLS] find that job displacement in Pennsylvania in the early 1980s 
led on average to earnings losses of more than 50%. Even five years after displacement, JLS find 
losses of 30% relative to the pre-displacement mean. These losses do not substantially fade even 
10 years after job displacement (von Wachter and Sullivan, 2009).  Schoeni and Dardia (2003) 
and Kodrzycki (2007) find similar results for job displacement in manufacturing industries in the 
mild recession of the early 1990s in California and Massachusetts, respectively.  
Earnings losses are large and long lasting even in regions and periods with stronger labor 
markets.  For  example,  Couch  and  Placzek  (2010)  examine  job  displacement  using  quarterly 
earnings data from unemployment insurance records in Connecticut in the 1990s.  They find that 
high-tenure workers suffer persistent losses in earnings up to five years after a job displacement. 
Similarly,  JLS  show  that  workers  displaced  in  Pennsylvania  counties  with  below-average 
unemployment rates and above-average employment growth fare significantly better than the 
average worker, but still suffer earnings losses. VSM find substantial earnings losses for job 
displacements  during  the  late-1980s  expansion  that  fade  only  after  15  years.    Studies  using 
longitudinal survey data to compare earnings of job losers to a control group, which typically do 
not focus on depressed areas or periods, also find large earnings and wage losses that persist up 
to five to ten years (e.g., Topel, 1990, Ruhm, 1991, and Stevens, 1997). 
The findings from administrative data pertain to annual or quarterly earnings. Hence, the 
earnings losses potentially arise from reductions in both employment and wages. However, the 
earnings loss for the median worker in the sample is about as large, and more persistent, than the 
mean  loss  (VSM,  Schoeni  and  Dardia,  2003).  This  result  and  survey-based  evidence  that 
employment reductions after a job loss tend to be temporary, and that most job losers returning 	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
to the labor force find full-time jobs (e.g., Farber 1999), suggest that the bulk of earnings losses 
after job displacement reflects a reduction in wage rates or hours worked per employed.   
One natural question about studies based on administrative data is how the earnings loss 
results  depend  on  the  definition  of  job  displacement,  the  choice  of  control  groups  and  the 
specification of mass-layoff events.  VSM find that their results survive the use of alternative 
firm  size  thresholds,  different  definitions  of  mass  layoffs,  alternative  employment  stability 
requirements for control groups, and other robustness checks.  von Wachter, Handwerker, and 
Hildreth (2008) obtain similar results using control groups constructed from workers in similar 
firms and industries.  Studies based on panel survey data that do not impose restrictions on firm 
size or firm events yield results for earnings similar to results based on administrative data.  
Overall, a central finding in previous research is that job displacement leads to large and 
long-lasting earnings losses, especially under weak labor market conditions. This observation 
suggests that workers who have experienced job displacement events since 2008 are likely to 
experience unusually severe and persistent earnings losses.  Direct evidence on the losses of 
recently  displaced  workers  is  limited,  in  part  because  of  lags  in  processing  and  analyzing 
administrative data sources. The latest Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) to the Current 
Population Survey, conducted in January 2010, contains recall data for workers displaced from 
2007 to 2009.  Given the absence of a control group, the inability to incorporate earnings losses 
due to employment reductions, and the presence of measurement error in wages and job loss 
events, DWS data tend to show lower earnings losses than studies based on administrative data 
(von  Wachter,  Handwerker,  and  Hildreth  2008).  However,  even  the  DWS  data  implies 
substantial earnings losses for persons who lost jobs from 2007 to 2009.  Based on DWS data, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011) reports that only 49% of workers displaced in 2007-2009 
with 3 or more years of prior job tenure are currently employed, and that among the reemployed, 
36% report current earnings at least 20% lower than on the previous job. 
The earnings losses associated with job displacement are large and persistent for both 
women and men and in all major industries. Older workers tend to have larger immediate losses 
than younger workers. Relative to a control group of similar age, however, the earnings losses of 
younger displaced workers are non-negligible and persist over twenty years (VSM).  Earnings 
losses tend to rise with tenure on the job, industry or occupation (e.g., Kletzer 1989, Neal 1995, 
Poletaev  and  Robinson,  2008).  Yet,  losses  for  workers  with  3  to  5  years  of  job  tenure  are 	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
substantial and long lasting, and even workers with less than three years of job tenure experience 
non-negligible declines in annual earnings following a job displacement event (VSM). 
b.  Estimated Earnings Losses Associated with Job Displacement 
We now follow VSM in estimating the earnings effects of job displacement and their 
sensitivity to economic conditions at the time of displacement.  We define job displacement as in 
Section 2 – the separation of high-tenure men, 50 years or younger, from firms with at least 50 
employees at baseline in mass-layoff events.  We also provide some results for women and older 
men.  To estimate the effects of job displacement, we compare the earnings path of workers who 
experience job displacement to the path of similar workers who did not separate during the same 
time period, while controlling for individual fixed effects and differential earnings trends.  
We  implement  this  comparison  by  estimating  the  following  distributed-lag  model 
separately for each displacement year y from 1980 onwards: 
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   (1) 
where the outcome variable   is real annual earnings of individual i in year t in 2000 dollars 
(using the Consumer Price Index),   
  are coefficients on worker fixed effects,   are 
coefficients on calendar year fixed effects,   is a quartic polynomial in the age of worker i at t, 
and the error      represents random factors. To allow further differences in annual earnings 
increments by a worker’s initial level of earnings, the specification includes differential year 
effects that vary proportionally to the worker’s average earnings,  , in the five years prior to 
the displacement year.  The    
  are dummy variables equal to one in the worker’s k-th year 
before or after his displacement, and zero otherwise. 
We estimate (1) by displacement year using annual individual-level observations in the 
SSA data from 1974 to 2008. The sample for displacement year y contains data on workers 
displaced in y, y+1 and y+2 plus data on workers in a control group described below.
12  The 
evolution of earnings of the control group over time helps identify the year effects   and  
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12 We include displacements that occur in y+1 and y+2 in the sample for displacement year y to raise the number of 
observations on displaced workers, and to align the inclusion windows for displaced and control group workers. 
Note that this approach smooths the estimated earnings effects of job displacement from one displacement year to 
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 . ﾠ ﾠGiven the presence of the year effects and worker fixed effects in (1), the coefficients   on 
the dummies   measure the time path of earnings changes for job separators from six years 
before and up to 20 years after a displacement -- relative to the baseline and relative to the 
change in earnings of the control group.
13  The baseline consists of years seven and eight before 
displacement.
14 To interpret the estimated effects   as the causal effect of job displacement on 
earnings requires that, conditional on worker fixed effects and the other control variables, the 
counterfactual earnings of displaced workers in the absence of job displacement is captured by 
workers in the control group.  To obtain the counterfactual earnings path of a displaced worker i 
absent displacement, we evaluate (1) at  =0 for all k. 
For workers displaced in year y, the control group consists of workers not separating 
from in y, y+1, and y+2 (‘non separators’). Hence, as typical in the literature on job displacement 
based on administrative data, we exclude so-called ‘non-mass layoff separators’ from y to y+2 
from the control group. Non-mass layoff separators comprise workers who quit their jobs and 
workers laid off by firms with an employment drop of less than 30%.  We impose the same 
restrictions with restrict to firm size, worker age and job tenure, gender, and industry as for 
displaced workers. We discuss the impact of alternative control groups and concerns related to 
potential selection bias in the earnings loss estimates in Section 3.d below.  
Figure 5 reports results for men 50 or younger with at least 3 years of prior job tenure as 
of the displacement year. To obtain average earnings losses for job displacements in expansions 
and  recessions,  we  average  over  estimated  values  of    in  recession  and  expansion  years, 
respectively.  If a peak or trough falls inside a given calendar year, we weight the year according 
to the number of its months in expansion or recession when computing the averages.  Panel A 
shows these average earnings loss profiles relative to the mean earnings of displaced workers, 
normalized to reflect changes relative to mean earnings in years t-4 to t-1 prior to displacement. 
Panel B shows the average time paths of mean raw earnings before and after displacement for 
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13 Since our sample window stops in 2008, for displacement years after 1988 we do not observe 20 years of earnings 
data after a displacement. For these years, the post-displacement dummies are included up to the maximum possible 
number of years. 
14 For 1980 (1981), the baseline is years five and six (six and seven) before displacement. We also drop the dummy 
variable for the first calendar year in each regression.  These zero restrictions, two for the baseline and one for the 
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workers displaced in recessions and expansions.  Panel C in Figure 5 shows the Panel A losses as 
a fraction of pre-displacement mean earnings.  
Earnings losses at displacement relative to the control group are very large initially, 40% 
in  the  first  year  after  displacement  for  displacements  that  occur  in  recessions  and  23%  for 
displacements that occur in expansions.  They are also long lasting. The average earnings losses 
are about 20% from 10 to 20 years out for displacements that occur in recessions and about 10% 
for those that occur in expansions. These estimates are robust to many specification checks, as 
discussed below and in VSM. For example, the earnings losses are similar if one defines a mass-
layoff event as a firm-level employment decline of at least 80%. They are slightly larger for 
workers with 6 years or more of job tenure (the main comparison group of JLS and others), and 
slightly smaller for workers with 3 to 5 years of job tenure. 
Figure 6 plots estimated short-term earnings losses against the national unemployment 
rate in the year of displacement. The definition of short-term loss in this figure is the earnings 
loss in t+2 for a job displacement in t, as estimated from equation (1), divided by displaced 
workers’ pre-displacement mean earnings in years t-4 to t-1. The figure displays a clear inverse 
relationship. If we regress the percentage loss on the unemployment rate at displacement, we 
obtain an R
2 of 0.22 and a slope coefficient of -0.022 (standard error of 0.008).  That is, a rise in 
the unemployment rate from 5% to 9% at the time of displacement implies that the earnings loss 
in the third year of displacement increases from 18% to 26% of average annual pre-displacement 
earnings.    Since  the  earnings  recovery  pattern  in  Figure  5C  is  approximately  parallel  in 
expansions and recessions, Figure 6 suggests that the state of the labor market at displacement 
sets the initial level of losses, from which a gradual recovery occurs. We will use this result 
when calculating PDV earnings losses.  
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Figure 5A: Average Annual Earnings Before and After Job Displacement Relative to 





Figure 5B: Average Annual Earnings Before and After Job Displacement, Men 50 or 
Younger with at Least 3 Years of Job Tenure  
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Figure 5C: Average Annual Earnings Losses Before and After Job Displacement Relative 
to Control Group Earnings As Percentage of Pre-Displacement Earnings, Men 50 or 
Younger with At Least 3 Years of Job Tenure  
 
 
Notes to Figures 5A, 5B and 5C: 
1.  Year 1 on the horizontal axis is the displacement year.  Year 0 is the last year of earnings 
from the main employer before displacement. 
2.  Panels A show average annual earnings losses relative to pre-displacement earnings for 
male workers, 50 years or younger at the time of displacement, with 3 or more years of 
tenure prior to job loss.  The earnings losses reflect differences in the path of mean 
annual earnings between displaced workers and control group workers. Panel B, which 
does not involve a control group comparison, shows average annual earnings rather than 
earnings losses.  Panel C shows the figures of Panel A, divided by pre-displacement 
average annual earnings from t-4 to t-1. 
3.  One curve in each panel shows average outcomes for workers displaced in recession 
years from 1980 to 2005, and the other shows average outcomes for those displaced in 
expansion years.  When a given displacement year straddles recession and expansion 
periods, we apportion that year’s values based on its number of months in each category. 
For example, if 3 months of the year are in recession, we allocate its values to recession 
and expansion categories with weights 0.25 and 0.75, respectively. 
4.  The earnings losses in Panels A and C for each year before and after displacement is the 
difference in average annual earnings (including zeros) for workers who separate from 
their main employers in mass-layoffs events, expressed as a difference relative to a pre-
displacement baseline from t-4 to t-1 and relative to workers who did not separate from 
employers.  The underlying regression includes controls for worker effects, calendar year 
effects, age, and interacts calendar year fixed-effects with individual average earnings in 	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
the five years preceding displacement.  The earnings levels in Panel B are constructed in 
a similar manner.  See the text discussion of equation (1) for additional details. 
5.  The earnings losses and levels are estimated using administrative data on W2 earnings 
following von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011), as described in the text. 
 
Figure 6: Annual Earnings Losses in the Third Year of Job Displacement vs. National 
Unemployment Rate in the Year of Job Displacement, Men with at Least 3 Years of Job 
Tenure Prior to Displacement 
 
Notes: 
1.  The figure shows the loss in annual earnings (including zeros) for high-tenure workers 
displaced in mass-layoff events three years of displacement, expressed as a fraction of 
displaced workers’ mean annual earnings in the four years before displacement.  The 
figure plots this earnings loss measure against the unemployment rate in the year of 
displacement.  High-tenure workers are those with 3 or more years of job tenure in the 
year before the mass-layoff event.    
2.  Data point labels in the figure refer to the year of displacement and the year of the 
unemployment rate. 
3.  The earnings loss is calculated using administrative earnings data from W2 earnings 
records used in von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011) and described in the text. 
 
c.  Present Value Earnings Losses Associated with Job Displacement 
Figures 5 and 6 point to large PDV earnings losses associated with job displacement and 
large differences between the PDV losses of displacements that occur in expansions versus those 
that occur in recessions. To derive estimates of PDV earnings losses from the annual earnings 
losses before and after job displacement shown in Figure 5, we proceed as follows. Using a real 	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
interest rate of 5%, we sum the discounted losses over a 20-year period starting with the year of 
displacement.  Since we do not observe the full 20 years of earnings after a job displacement for 
workers displaced in later years, we impose a common rate of decay past the tenth year. Hence, 
the estimated PDV of earnings losses in, say, a recession can be written as  
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(   )    
(   )             (2) 
where   is the average estimated earnings losses of displacements occurring in recessions in 
year s after job displacement (derived by averaging the results for equation (1) over different 
displacement years), and    
  (1 −  )     is the extrapolated earnings loss using the rate of decay 
. The evolution of earnings losses is roughly parallel for displacements in expansions and 
recessions, so we use the average decay rate of earnings losses over all periods. If the rate of 
decay is faster in booms, this choice understates the cyclical differences in the cost of job loss. 
In principle, we could use the actual earnings path for those displacement cohorts that we 
follow  more  than  ten  years  after  job  loss.  In  practice,  however,  as  the  sample  of  workers 
displaced in a given year ages and labor force participation declines, the estimates for long after 
the displacement year may be affected by changes in composition and greater sampling error in 
smaller samples. Similarly, using actual estimates for the long-run follow up period may put 
weight on cohorts that have particularly long-lasting effects. Given our aim to approximate the 
average PDV loss for a typical worker in boom and recession years, we chose a common decay 
rate for all displacement cohorts. To smooth out sampling variability in the recovery pattern and 
to maximize the number of available cohorts, we calculate the decay rate as the average of 
annualized  log  differences  in  earnings  losses  from  years  6  to  10  to  years  11  to  15  after 
displacement. This approach balances the influence of displacements in the early 1990s, which 
reflect a strong recovery in the high-pressure labor market of the mid to late 1990s, and the 
influence of displacements in other periods. 
Since earnings levels change over time and may differ between displacements that occur 
in expansions and recessions, we consider three ways of normalizing the absolute earnings 
losses. First, we scale the PDV earnings loss by displaced workers’ mean annual earnings in 
years t-4 through t-1 prior to displacement. This approach expresses the PDV loss as the number 
of earnings years lost at the previous level of earnings. Second, we express the PDV earnings 
loss as percent of the average pre-displacement earnings from t-4 to t-1. Third, we express the 
R
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PDV earnings losses as a percentage of PDV earnings along the counterfactual earnings path in 
the absence of displacement. To do so, we first construct a counterfactual earnings path absent 
job displacement by adding the absolute value of the estimated earnings loss (Panel A of Figure 
5) back to the actual level of average earnings (Panel B of Figure 5). In the notation of equation 
(1), for workers displaced in each year y we thereby effectively obtain  . 
Using the mean earnings of displaced workers as a benchmark ensures that we average over the 
right worker fixed effects and obtain the right earnings levels. We then take the average of the 
counterfactual in years belonging to NBER recessions and expansions, respectively.
15 Using 
these averages, we divide the PDV earnings loss by the resulting PDV of counterfactual earnings 
in booms and recession, respectively.  
Table  1  reports  these  alternative  measures  of  the  PDV  earnings  loss  after  a  job 
displacement – again for men 50 years or younger with at least three prior years of positive 
earnings at an employer with at least 50 workers.  The definition of displacement is the same as 
in Figure 5. The first row shows estimated PDV earnings losses, averaged over all displacement 
years. The average PDV earnings loss is about $77,557 (Column1), which amounts to 1.71 times 
average annual pre-displacement earnings (column 2) and 11.9% of the PDV of counterfactual 
earnings absent job displacement (Column 3).  
The next two rows of the table show our measures of PDV earnings losses separately for 
expansions and recessions. As anticipated from Figure 5, the PDV losses are much larger in 
recessions  than  expansions.    A  worker  displaced  in  a  recession  experiences  PDV  losses  of 
$109,567, which amounts to 2.50 years of average pre-displacement earnings, and to 18.6% 
decline relative to counterfactual earnings absent displacement. In contrast, the PDV of earnings 
losses experienced by workers displaced in an expansion is $72,487, which amounts to 1.59 of 
pre-displacement  earnings.  In  short,  job  displacements  lead  to  very  large  declines  in  PDV 
earnings, and the loss is much larger for displacements that occur in recessions. 
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15 Similarly, we calculate the corresponding mean of actual annual earnings before and after displacement by first 
obtaining the average for each displacement year,  , and then averaging over the years belonging to 
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Table 1. Magnitude and Cyclicality of Present Value Earnings Losses Associated with 
Displacement in Mass-Layoff Events from 1980 to 2005, Men 50 or Younger with at Least 




1.  See note 5 to Figure 2 and Section 2 of the text for definition of mass-layoff events. 
2.  To compute the entries in this table, we averaged earnings losses by displacement year 
from VSM (2011) over recession and expansion years. When a given displacement year 
straddles recession and expansion periods or multiple unemployment intervals, we 













Average All Years -- -77,557 -1.71 -11.9
Avg. in NBER Expansion Years 0.88 -72,487 -1.59 -11.0
Avg. in NBER Recession Years 0.12 -109,567 -2.50 -18.6
Average in Years with:
 UR< 5% 0.23 -50,953 -1.06 -9.9
5%<=UR<6% 0.35 -71,460 -1.56 -10.9
6%<=UR<7% 0.13 -71,006 -1.58 -10.7
7%<=UR<8% 0.21 -89,792 -2.07 -14.4
UR>=8% 0.08 -121,982 -2.82 -19.8
Present Discounted Value 
(PDV) of Average Loss at 
Job Displacement 
Ratio of PDV 
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example, if 3 months of the year are in recession, we allocate its values to recession and 
expansion categories with weights 0.25 and 0.75, respectively.   
3.  We calculate the estimated PV earnings losses over 20 years after job displacement, using 
a 5 percent annual discount rate.  See text for an explanation of how we impute earnings 
losses in the out years for which we lack direct estimates.  
 
Recall  from  Figure  1  that  the  incidence  of  job  displacement  is  also  much  greater  in 
recessions.  Given that displacements have more severe consequences in recessions, the un-
weighted  averages  over  years  in  row  1  understate  average  PDV  earnings  losses  taken  over 
displaced workers.
16  Similarly, because we weight all recession years equally, while recessions 
with  higher  displacement  rates  also  involve  higher  earnings  losses,  Table  1  understates  the 
average PDV earnings losses taken over job displacements that occur in recessions. 
The  lower  panel  of  Table  1  shows  how  estimated  PDV  earnings  losses  vary  by  the 
unemployment  rate  in  the  year  of  displacement.  The  unemployment  rate  reflects 
contemporaneous labor market conditions at the time of displacement in a different way than 
NBER business cycle dating. As before, to calculate the table entries, we first estimate PDV 
earnings losses by year of displacement. In a second step, we average over all years falling into 
an indicated unemployment range, assigning fractional weights to years that fall partly into a 
given range.  The results show that PDV earnings losses rise steeply with the unemployment rate 
in the year of job displacement.  This important finding strongly reinforces and extends the 
evidence in Figure 6. 
To take this result one step further, we repeat our procedure for calculating PDV earnings 
losses by year of displacement.  We now depart from working with averages over multiple 
displacement years and consider a separate earnings loss path for each displacement year. When 
we have more than ten years of post-displacement information, we use the first ten years and 
extrapolate from year 11 to 20 using the same average rate of decay as before.  When we have 
less than ten years of post-displacement information (i.e., starting in 1999), we also use the 
available information for other years to construct decay rates in the earlier post-displacement 
years, say 6 to 10 years after displacement.  For years closer to the end of our sample period, we 
necessarily rely more heavily on extrapolation.  
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Figure  7  plots  the  resulting  PDV  earnings  losses  (expressed  as  multiples  of  average 
annual pre-displacement earnings) against the unemployment rate in the year of displacement. 
The figure again shows an approximately linear relationship, which is not surprising given the 
roughly linear relationship in Figure 6 and our use of a common decay rate beyond the tenth year 
after displacement. Even allowing for different post-displacement recovery patterns, the figure 
suggests that PDV earnings losses increase approximately linearly with the unemployment rate 
in the year of displacement. A linear regression of the PDV loss measure on the unemployment 
rate in the year of displacement yields an R
2 of 0.27 with a slope coefficient of -0.23 (0.08). 
Thus, an increase from 5% to 9% in the unemployment rate at displacement implies that PDV 
earnings losses rise from 1.6 to 2.5 years of pre-displacement earnings. When we add the NBER 
recession indicator to this descriptive regression model, it is not statistically significant.  
 
Figure 7: Present Discounted Value of Earnings Losses By Year of Displacement vs. 





1.  The present discounted value of earnings losses are defined as in Table 1. For each year 
of displacement, we compute the discounted sum of earnings losses in the first 20 years 
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sample window, we use the average rate of decay in the respective ranges of years after 
job displacement observed in the remainder of the sample. 
2.  The earnings losses are calculated using administrative earnings data from W2 earnings 
records used in von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011) and described in the text. 
 
Table 2 shows PDV earnings losses for men with at least 6 years of tenure, for women, 
and for four age groups.
17 The PDV earnings losses due to job displacement are large for all 
groups. Comparing Tables 1 and 2, the losses are larger for men with higher job tenure prior to 
displacement.    They  are  smaller  for  women,  but  not  dramatically  so  once  we  control  for 
differences in average earnings levels between men and women.  For example, the average losses 
for women 50 or younger with 3 or more years of prior job tenure amount to 1.5 years of pre-
displacement earnings (Table 2), as compared to 1.7 years for the corresponding group of men 
(Table 1).  Except for workers displaced near the end of their working lives, PDV earnings losses 
are much larger for displacements that occur in recessions. 
 
d.  On Selection Bias and Sensitivity to Control Group Choice 
We now discuss two potential concerns about the earnings loss estimates that underlie 
our results in Figures 5 to 7 and Tables 1 and 2: selection bias and the sensitivity of our results to 
the choice of control group.  Relative to non-separators (our control group), non-mass layoff 
separators  experience  earnings  losses  that  are  smaller  and  less  persistent  than  the  losses 
experienced by mass-layoff separators. Thus, if we include non-mass layoff separators in the 
control  group,  the  estimated  earnings  losses  due  to  job  displacement  become  smaller.  VSM 
estimate a version of regression (1) with non-mass layoff separators as part of the control group.  
This change in the composition of the control group reduces the estimated earnings losses by 
about one quarter.  VSM also consider instrumental variables estimates that are not affected by 
the presence of voluntary separators, which we discuss below, and obtain results very similar to 
the  ones  we  report.    After  considering  various  estimators,  VSM  confirm  the  conclusion  in 
previous research that the ‘true’ loss at displacement is closer to the estimates that exclude non-
mass layoff separators from the control group. 
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Average All Years -106,900 -2.0 -12.9
Avg. in NBER Expansion Years -100,543 -1.8 -11.9
Avg. in NBER Recession Years -148,400 -3.0 -20.0
Average All Years -38,033 -1.5 -10.9
Avg. in NBER Expansion Years -33,164 -1.3 -9.5
Avg. in NBER Recession Years -68,782 -3.3 -20.6
Average All Years -50,240 -1.6 -9.8
Avg. in NBER Expansion Years -39,639 -1.3 -7.8
Avg. in NBER Recession Years -117,322 -3.7 -22.0
Average All Years -49,599 -1.2 -7.7
Avg. in NBER Expansion Years -42,555 -1.1 -6.5
Avg. in NBER Recession Years -93,833 -2.5 -16.0
Average All Years -98,519 -1.9 -15.9
Avg. in NBER Expansion Years -95,716 -1.8 -15.1
Avg. in NBER Recession Years -116,515 -2.8 -21.9
Average All Years -99,288 -2.4 -24.0
Avg. in NBER Expansion Years -97,934 -2.3 -23.1
Avg. in NBER Recession Years -108,248 -3.2 -31.1
Men with 3 or More Years of Job 
Tenure and age 31-40 at 
Displacement 
Men with 3 or More Years of Job 
Tenure and age 41-50 at 
Displacement 
Men with 3 or More Years of Job 
Tenure and age 51-60 at 
Displacement 
Present Discounted Value (PDV) 
of Average Loss at Job 
Displacement 
Ratio of PDV of 






Men with 6 or More Years of Job 
Tenure at Displacement
Women with 3 or More Years of 
Job Tenure at Displacement
Men with 3 or More Years of Job 
Tenure and age 21-30 at 
Displacement 	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Notes to Table 2 :  
1.  See notes to Table 1.  This table differs from Table 1 in its focus on different groups of 
workers. 
2.  For workers displaced up to age 40, we calculate the present discounted value over the 
following 20 years. For workers displaced age 40-50 (50-60), we calculate it over 15 (10) 
years. 
 
Estimates based on equation (1) may overstate earnings losses at displacement because 
displaced workers are negatively selected on observable and unobservable characteristics with 
respect  to  the  control  group.    VSM  conduct  an  in-depth  investigation  of  this  question,  and 
conclude that earnings losses based on equation (1) are robust to a range of important sensitivity 
checks. The presence of worker fixed-effects in equation (1) implies that selection based on fixed 
worker attributes with a time-invariant effect on earnings poses no problem. However, different 
trends  in  counterfactual  earnings  between  displaced  workers  and  the  control  group  may 
introduce a bias. For example, it is well known that there have been differential earnings growth 
rates in different parts of the earnings distribution (e.g., Autor and Katz, 1999). Since displaced 
workers  have  lower  average  earnings  prior  to  displacement  than  non-displaced  workers,  our 
regression  models  include  interactions  between  average  earnings  in  the  five  years  prior  to 
displacement  and  fixed  effects  for  calendar  years.  VSM  also  present  estimates  that  include 
differential trends by two-digit industry and by other observable characteristics of workers and 
firms prior to displacement. The estimates are reasonably robust to these modifications, and only 
decline somewhat when including industry-specific trends. 
However,  ex-ante  differences  in  unobservable  characteristics  between  treatment  and 
control groups can still lead to differential counterfactual earnings trends. In this respect, VSM 
address two types of selection – within and between employers.  To address the concern that 
displaced workers are negatively selected on potential unobserved earnings trends within firms, 
VSM replicate equation (1) using the mass-layoff event at the firm level as an instrumental 
variable for displacement.  That is, they use a dummy for the year of the mass layoff at the firm, 
, where f(i) is the worker’s employer, to instrument for the dummy of the individual layoff 
( ).  Hence, the comparison is now between the earnings of all workers at firms undergoing 
mass layoffs and the evolution of earnings among all workers at non-mass layoff firms.  Using 
this type of firm-level indicator to instrument for displacement, and controlling for differential 
trends by pre-mass layoff characteristics at the firm level, VSM obtain results very similar to 
k
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those based on (1). This IV estimator is also robust to the presence of non-mass layoff separators, 
since the instrument should be orthogonal to the rate of retirement or voluntary mobility.
  
To also address the potential concern that workers with lower potential earnings trends 
sort into firms more likely to experience mass layoffs, VSM follow previous work and consider a 
version  of  (1)  that  includes  firm  fixed  effects.    This  specification  yields  somewhat  smaller 
estimated earnings losses, because the losses of workers remaining at firms with mass layoffs are 
now  subtracted  from  the  losses  of  displaced  workers.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  decline  in 
earnings for those remaining at mass-layoff firms should be subtracted or treated as part of the 
outcome.  In  any  event,  the  estimated  earnings  losses  remain  substantial  and  very  persistent.  
VSM conclude that estimates based on (1), on which we rely, are robust to a range of important 
sensitivity checks.  Hence, despite some variation in the final magnitude of the loss depending on 
the exact specification, we believe our calculations based on estimated versions of (1) accurately 
capture the magnitude and persistence of earnings losses caused by job displacement.  
 
4.  Other Costs of Job Displacement and Unemployment 
Section 3 focuses on earnings losses associated with displacement events.  We turn now 
to the effects of job displacement on other outcomes such as consumption, health, mortality and 
children’s  achievement.  We  also  present  new  evidence  on  cyclical  movements  in  worker 
anxieties and perceptions about the risk of job loss and the ease or difficulty of job finding.    
a.  Effects on Income, Consumption and Employment Stability 
It is not easy to estimate the effects of job displacement on consumption and income.  
Few, if any, data sets that track large numbers of workers over time contain high-quality 
information about consumption outcomes. Likewise, very few data sets that track large numbers 
of workers include the requisite data on earnings, asset incomes, and public and private transfer 
payments needed to identify income responses to job displacement events.  Moreover, transfer 
payments are understated greatly in many household surveys that include such information 
(Meyer, Mok and Sullivan, 2010). 
The few studies that estimate the effects of job loss or unemployment on consumption 
typically find sizable near-term declines in consumption expenditures (and lack evidence on 
long-term consumption responses).  See Gruber (1997) and Stephens (2004), for example.  The 
consumption responses tend to be concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution 	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(Browning and Crossley, 2001, and CBO, 2004). While transfer programs often mitigate the 
earnings loss due to job displacement, the replacement amounts are quite modest compared to 
our estimates of present value earnings losses. Even the generous, long-lasting benefits available 
under the German unemployment insurance system replace only a modest share of the earnings 
loss associated with job displacement (Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender, 2009).  
Previous research also finds that job displacement leads to other adverse consequences.  
Lasting post-displacement earnings shortfalls occur alongside lower job stability, greater 
earnings instability, recurring spells of joblessness, and multiple switches of industry or 
occupation (Stevens 1997, VSM).  Much of the increased mobility between jobs, industries and 
occupations probably reflects privately and socially beneficial adjustments.  On average, 
however, displaced workers who immediately find a stable job in their pre-displacement industry 
obtain significantly higher earnings.  Lower job stability and higher earnings volatility persist up 
to ten years after displacement.  Thus, there is no indication that laid-off workers trade a lower 
earnings level for a more stable path of employment and earnings. 
b.  Effects on Health, Mortality, Emotional Well-Being and Family  
There is also evidence that displaced workers suffer short- and long-term declines in 
health.    Survey-based  research  in  epidemiology  finds  that  layoffs  and  unemployment  spells 
involve a higher incidence of stress-related health problems such as strokes and heart attacks 
(e.g., Burgard, Brand, and House 2007).  
While studies of self-reported health and job loss outcomes face significant challenges 
related to measurement error and recall and selection bias, the analysis of mortality outcomes 
lends itself to the use of large administrative data sources. Sullivan and von Wachter (2010) 
study the effects of job displacement on mortality outcomes for 20 years following displacement.  
They use administrative data on earnings and employers from the Pennsylvania unemployment 
insurance system and mortality data from the Social Security Administration. Their results show 
that mature men who lost stable jobs in Pennsylvania during the early 1980s experienced near-
term increases in mortality rates of up to 100%. The initial impact on mortality falls over time, 
but it remains significantly higher for job losers than for comparable workers throughout the 20-
year post-displacement period covered by their study. If sustained until the end of life, the higher 
mortality rates for displaced workers imply a reduction in life expectancy of 1 to 1.5 years. 	 ﾠ 30	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Because the 1980s recession was especially deep in Pennsylvania and involved unusually 
large earnings losses for displaced workers, the mortality effects estimated by Sullivan and von 
Wachter (2010) reflect a very bad-case scenario. It is reasonable to expect smaller mortality 
effects of job displacements in most other years and places. Unfortunately, U.S. labor market 
conditions in the past three years have also been dismal, with persistently high unemployment 
rates. In that respect, the mortality estimates in Sullivan and von Wachter may well provide a 
suitable  guide  to  mortality  effects  for  recently  displaced  American  workers.  The  available 
evidence  indicates  that  job  displacement  also  raises  mortality  rates  in  countries  with  public 
health insurance systems and generous social welfare systems, for example in Sweden (Eliason 
and Storrie 2009) and Norway (Rege, Telle, and Votruba 2009).  These studies find higher 
mortality rates in the years following job displacement, but they contain little information about 
long-term effects. 
Several studies point to short- and long-term effects of layoffs on the children and families 
of job losers and unemployed workers. In the short run, parental job loss reduces schooling 
achievement of children (Stevens and Schaller, 2009). In the long run, it appears that a lasting 
reduction in the earnings of fathers reduces the earnings prospects of their sons (Oreopoulos, 
Page, and Stevens 2008). Wrightman (2009) also finds that parental job loss is harmful for the 
educational attainment and cognitive development of children. Other studies find that layoffs 
raise  divorce  incidence,  reduce  fertility,  reduce  home  ownership,  and  increase  the  rate  of 
application to and entry into disability insurance programs.
18 Last but not least, and perhaps not 
surprisingly given the magnitude and range of adverse consequences discussed above, job loss 
and unemployment also lead to a reduction in happiness and life satisfaction.  See, for example, 
Frey and Stutzer (2002). 
Clearly, care should be taken in drawing welfare conclusions and policy prescriptions 
from the range of adverse consequences associated with job displacement. However, this brief 
review makes clear that job displacement entails a variety of significant short- and long-run costs 
for  affected  workers  and  their  families.  Neither  the  large  present  value  earnings  losses  we 
estimate nor estimated consumption responses capture the full measure of costs associated with 
job displacement.  
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c.  Cyclical Movements in Worker Anxieties and Perceptions 
Given the severity of job displacement effects on earnings and other outcome measures, it 
is natural to ask how worker anxieties and perceptions about labor market conditions track actual 
conditions.    Evidence  on  this  issue  is  potentially  informative  in  several  respects.    First,  if 
recessions or high unemployment rates cause employed workers to become more fearful about 
layoffs and wage cuts, they involve psychological costs beyond the direct effects on job-losing 
workers and their families.  Second, perceptions about labor market conditions are likely to 
influence  search  behavior  by  employed  and  unemployed  workers,  including  those  who 
experience  a  displacement  event.    Third,  high  levels  of  worker  anxiety  about  labor  market 
conditions  are  likely  to  undermine  consumer  confidence  and  depress  consumption 
expenditures.
19 Fourth, perceptions about labor market conditions have important influences on 
policymaking,  politics  and  electoral  outcomes.  Because  they  potentially  influence  so  many 
voters, anxieties about labor market conditions may have more important political consequences 
than actual conditions.  
  For a long-running source of data on perceptions about labor market conditions, we turn 
to the General Source Survey (GSS).  The GSS is a repeated cross-sectional household survey 
conducted since 1972. It includes two categorical response questions that are useful for gauging 
cyclical  movements  in  perceptions  about  labor  market  conditions.  One  question  asks  the 
respondent about the perceived likelihood that he or she will lose a job or be laid off in the next 
12 months.  Another question asks about the perceived difficulty of finding a job with the same 
income and fringe benefits as the respondent’s current job.  
Figure 8 shows, for all available years in the GSS, the percentage of prime age workers 
who consider it “very likely” or “fairly likely” to lose a job or be laid off in the next 12 months.  
We plot these values against CPS unemployment rates in 5-month windows that bracket the GSS 
interview months.  There is a strong, positive relationship between the perceived likelihood of 
job loss and the actual unemployment rate.  According to the fitted relationship in Figure 8, an 
increase in the prime age unemployment rate from 4% to 8% raises from 10 to 15 the percentage 
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of prime age workers who perceive job loss as fairly or very likely.  The online appendix shows 
a very similar pattern for all employed workers 18-64 years of age. 
 
Figure 8.  Perceived Likelihood of Job Loss or Layoff in the Next 12 Months, All Available 




1.  Tabulations of micro data in the General Social Survey and published data on seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rates in the Current Population Survey. We report the weighted 
percent of GSS respondents that considers it “very likely” or “fairly likely” to lose a job 
or be laid off in the next 12 months. 
2.  Prime age workers are employed adults between 25 and 54 years of age, excluding 
active-duty armed forces, persons who report self employment as the main job, and 
institutionalized persons.  We exclude the black oversamples in the GSS in certain years, 
and weight JOBLOSE responses using the WTTSALL variable.   
3.  The GSS interviews take place in February, March and April of selected years.  Data on 
the perceived probability of job loss are available for 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 
1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 and every two years from 1994. We use 
unemployment rates from January to May in each survey year, which extends one month 
on either side of the GSS interview period. 
 
Figure 9 shows the percent of prime age workers who perceive it to be “Not Easy” to find 
a job with income and fringe benefits similar to those in their current jobs.  As before, we plot 
these values against contemporaneous unemployment rates. Again, there is a strong relationship 
between perceived and actual labor market conditions. According to the fitted relationship in 	 ﾠ 33	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Figure 9, an increase in the prime age unemployment rate from 4% to 8% raises from 31 to 47 
the percentage of prime age workers who regard it as hard to find another job with a comparable 
compensation package.  In this regard, it is also worth noting that quit rates are highly pro-
cyclical – see, for example, Davis et al. (2011).  Quit rates plummeted in the most recession and 
remain extraordinarily low, another indication that workers perceive goods jobs as hard to find. 
 
Figure 9. Perceived Difficulty of Job Finding, All Available Years in the General Social 
Survey from 1977 to 2010 
   
 
Notes: 
1.  We report the weighted percent of GSS respondents who say it is “Not Easy” to find a 
job with the same income and fringe benefits as his or her current job.   We weight 
JOBFIND responses using the WTTSALL variable.  
2.  See notes to Figure 8. 
 
Gallup polls provide another long running, consistent source of data on perceived labor 
market conditions.  The Gallup data cover a shorter time period than the GSS data, but they 
pertain to a highly eventful period in terms of economic developments.  In addition, one of the 
Gallup measures is available at a (roughly) monthly frequency, which is useful for assessing the 
shorter-term relationship between perceived and actual conditions. Figure 10 draws on Gallup 
data  to  plot  the  percent  of  adult  interviewees  who  respond  yes  to  the  following  question: 
“Thinking about the job situation in American today, would you say that it is now a good time or 
a bad time to find a quality job?”  As seen in the figure, the percent responding “good time” is 	 ﾠ 34	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highly cyclically sensitive.  As the labor market tightened, yes responses rose from about 20 
percent in early 2003 to nearly 50 percent in the first half of 2007.  It then dropped to about 10 
percent over the next two years and has remained at very low levels ever since.  This evidence 
suggests that perceptions about labor market conditions respond rapidly to actual conditions. 
 





1.  Based on telephone interviews with random samples of adults, 18 years and older, living 
in the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.   Gallup conducts the interviews 
approximately once per month, and each round of interviews takes place over 3 or 4 days.  
We date each survey according to the first day of interviews. 
2.  The survey question reads as follows: “Thinking about the job situation in American 
today, would you say that it is now a god time or a bad time to find a quality job?” 
 
Source: Gallup polling data at www.gallup.com/148121/default.aspx.  Click on the link at “View 
methodology, full question results, and trend data” to obtain the document titled “Gallup News 
Service, June Wave 1, Final Topline”. 
 
Table 3 reports data from Gallup polls conducted during the month of August in 1997 
and 2003 to 2011.  The table shows a tremendous increase in worker anxiety levels following the 	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peak of the financial crisis in the latter part of 2008 and early 2009.  There were dramatic jumps 
in the percentages of employed adults who express worries that they personally will experience a 
cutback  in  hours,  a  wage  cut,  a  benefit  cut  and/or  a  layoff  in  the  near  future.    After  some 
lessening between August 2009 and August 2010, the most recent data for August 2011 show 
worker anxiety returning to peak or near-peak levels.  
 
Table 3. Worker Anxiety Rose Sharply in the Wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis and Have 
Remained High 
 
Percent of Employed Adults Who Worry that They 
Will Experience the Following in the Near Future 
  Hours Cut  Wage Cut  Benefit Cut  Lay Off 
August 1997  15  17  34  20 
August 2003  15  17  31  19 
August 2004  14  17  28  20 
August 2005  13  14  28  15 
August 2006  16  19  30  17 
August 2007  12  14  29  14 
August 2008  14  16  27  15 
August 2009  27  32  46  31 
August 2010  25  26  39  26 
August 2011  30  33  44  30 
 
Source: Reproduced from Gallup Polling data at www.gallup.com/poll/1720/work-work-
place.aspx and www.gallup.com/poll/149261/Worries-Job-Cutbacks-Return-Record-Highs.aspx. 
Based on polling of workers employed full or part time. 
 
In summary, the evidence presented in Figures 8-10 and Table 3 indicates that worker 
perceptions about labor market conditions are closely attuned to actual conditions.  The Gallup 
polling data, in particular, point to a dramatic deterioration in perceptions about labor market 
conditions and prospects after the financial crisis – one that persists to the present day and that 
involves widespread concerns about layoff risks, wage and benefit cuts, shorter hours, and the 
difficulty  of  finding  a  good  job.    Whether  or  not  these  fears  show  up  in  realized  earnings 
outcomes, they involve psychological costs in the form of heightened anxiety levels for a large 
segment of the population. 
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5. The Effects of Job Loss in Leading Theoretical Models of Unemployment and Labor 
Market Dynamics 
 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) present an equilibrium search and matching model that, 
in  various  formulations,  has  become  the  leading  framework  for  analyzing  aggregate 
unemployment fluctuations.  We now evaluate how well certain “MP” models account for our 
evidence  on  the  magnitude  and  cyclicality  of  the  earnings  losses  associated  with  job 
displacement.
20  Some preliminary remarks will set the stage and motivate our particular choice 
of models. 
a.  MP Models of Unemployment Fluctuations 
Shimer (2005) considers a basic version of the MP model with risk-neutral workers and 
firms, uniform match quality, Nash bargaining, and a constant rate of job destruction and job 
loss. Aggregate shocks drive employer decisions about vacancy posting and fluctuations in job 
creation, job finding and unemployment. Shimer shows that the basic MP model delivers too 
little volatility in unemployment for reasonable specifications of the aggregate shock process.
21  
Under Nash bargaining, the equilibrium wage largely absorbs shocks to labor productivity in 
the basic model.  As a result, realistic shocks have little impact on employer incentives to post 
vacancies, and the model generates small equilibrium responses in job-finding rates, hiring and 
unemployment. This unemployment volatility puzzle has motivated a great deal of research in 
recent years.   
One prominent strand of this research stresses the consequences of wage rigidities.
22  Hall 
and Milgrom (2008), for example, step away from Nash bargaining while retaining privately 
efficient  compensation  and  separation  outcomes.    They  replace  Nash  bargaining  with  the 
alternating-offer bargaining protocol proposed by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). 
The standard Nash wage bargain treats termination of the match opportunity as the threat point.  
In contrast, the threat point in Hall and Milgrom’s “credible bargaining” setup is a short delay 
followed, with high probability, by a resumption of bargaining.  This change in bargaining 
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20 There appear to be few previous efforts to evaluate whether equilibrium search and matching models can account 
for the earnings losses associated with job displacement.  An exception is Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).  
Davis (2005) provides some back-of-the-envelope calculations.  The loss of earnings potential upon job loss is an 
important element in the theoretical model of high European unemployment rates developed by Ljungqvist and 
Sargent’s (1998).  
21 See also Costain and Reiter (2008). 
22 See, for example, Shimer (2004, 2010), Hall (2005), Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Kennan (2009).  Mortensen 
and Nagypal (2007), Ramey (2008), Pissarides (2009), Burgess and Turon (2010), and Eyigungor (2010), among 
others, propose alternative resolutions to the unemployment volatility puzzle.   	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regime goes a long way to insulate the equilibrium wage bargain from aggregate shocks and 
outside labor market conditions.   
A key point is that the cost of a small delay during the bargaining process is less cyclical 
than the value of outside opportunities.  Hence, closing the basic MP model in the manner of 
Hall and Milgrom leads to greater sensitivity of the employer surplus value to aggregate shocks 
and bigger responses in vacancies, job-finding rates and unemployment.  Hall and Milgrom 
show  that  their  specification  of  the  bargaining  environment  resolves  the  unemployment 
volatility puzzle in a reasonably calibrated version of the basic MP model. 
In our analysis below, we adopt Hall and Milgrom’s credible bargaining version of the 
basic MP model and two versions with Nash bargaining.  We follow this approach for two 
reasons.  First, Hall and Milgrom offer perhaps the most successful version of the basic MP 
model  in  terms  of  explaining  the  cyclical  behavior  of  job-finding  rates,  vacancies  and 
unemployment.  Second, by comparing the credible bargaining and Nash versions of the model, 
we can determine whether a particular form of wage rigidity improves the model’s ability to 
account for the facts about earnings losses associated with job loss. 
Despite much attention to the basic MP model in recent work, the model misses some 
first-order features of labor market fluctuations. The basic MP model cannot reproduce the 
recessionary spikes in job destruction, job loss, and unemployment inflows depicted in Figures 
1 and 2.  Moreover, the model has no role for hires and separations apart from job flows.  There 
is  no  search  by  employed  workers,  no  job-to-job  movements,  and  no  replacement  hires. 
Related,  the  basic  model  entails  no  heterogeneity  of  productivity,  match  surplus  values  or 
wages.  This sort of heterogeneity seems important for generating large earnings losses due to 
job loss.  Given these limitations, we also consider a model of Burgess and Turon (2010) that 
extends Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) by incorporating search on the job and other changes. 
The model of Burgess and Turon produces hires and separations apart from job flows and 
recessionary spikes in job destruction, job loss and unemployment inflows.  
There  are  also  good  reasons  to  anticipate  that  the  model  of  Burgess  and  Turon  will 
generate larger earnings losses associated with job loss than the basic MP model.  As in Burdett 
and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and other models with search on the job, 
their model generates persistent heterogeneity in match surplus values and wages for workers 
of a given quality. As a related point, the model delivers a job ladder whereby newly re-	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employed workers tend to obtain jobs in the lower rungs of the wage distribution initially, and 
to move up the wage distribution over time through search on the job.  This job ladder feature 
prolongs the period of earnings recovery after displacement. Finally, Hornstein, Krusell and 
Violante (2010) show that plausibly parametrized versions of basic search models yield very 
modest levels of frictional wage dispersion, which implies little scope for earnings losses due to 
job loss when unemployment spells are short.  Hornstein et al. also consider several extensions 
to basic search models and, among those they consider, the only ones that offer much scope for 
cross-sectional wage dispersion are models with search on the job.   
b.  Income and Earnings Losses in the Basic MP Model 
Table  4  reports  statistics  for  three  versions  of  the  basic  MP  model:  The  credible 
bargaining version of Hall and Milgrom (2008) and two versions with Nash bargaining – a 
standard calibration similar to Shimer (2005) and another calibration similar to Hagedorn and 
Manoviski (2008).  These two calibrations differ chiefly in the level of income imputed to the 
unemployed, which we interpret as the sum of unemployment insurance benefits, the value of 
additional  leisure  and  home  production  activity,  and  any  savings  of  work-related  costs.  
Hagedorn and Manovskii set this value to a level nearly as large as the productivity of the 
employed, thereby amplifying the equilibrium response of unemployment to aggregate shocks.  
The  standard  calibration  involves  a  much  larger  gap  between  productivity  and  the  imputed 
income value of unemployment, yielding much smaller equilibrium responses to shocks of a 
given size.  Our calibrations follow Hall and Milgrom (2008) in their choice of parameter values 
for each version of the basic MP model.  See the online appendix for a detailed discussion of the 
model simulations and our calculations for the present value losses associated with job loss. 
Panel A in Table 4 highlights an important message: job loss and unemployment is a 
rather  inconsequential  event  for  persons  living  in  the  basic  MP  world.    Using  a  5%  annual 
discount rate, job loss reduces the present value of income by about 0.2% in the MP-CB and 
standard MP-Nash versions of the model and by less that 0.05% in the Hagedorn-Manovskii 
calibration. We compute these present value income losses directly from value functions.  That 
is, for each aggregate state we calculate the difference between the asset value of employment 
and the asset value of unemployment, expressing the difference relative to the asset value of 
employment.  Performing this calculation for all five aggregate states yields the reported ranges 
in Panel A.  If these results capture the real world costs of job loss, one might well wonder why 	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all the fuss – why are job loss and unemployment perceived as important economic phenomena 
and potent political issues? 
Table 4. Present Value Income and Earnings Losses Associated with Job Loss in the Basic 
Mortensen-Pissarides Model of Unemployment Fluctuations 
  PV Income Losses, Percent of 
Employment Asset Value 
PV Earnings 
Losses, Percent 
Model Version  MP-Nash  MP-Nash  MP-CB  MP-Nash 





A. Range of Mean Losses 
Over Five Aggregate States 
0.20 - 0.22  0.044 - 0.047  0.20 - 0.23   
   
B. All Aggregate Paths  Realized Outcomes   
  Mean Unemployment Rate  0.066  0.067  0.067   
 Monthly Job-Finding Rate  0.43  0.43  0.43   
Mean PV Losses  0.23  0.05  0.23  1.28 
10
th/90
th percentile losses  -0.55 / 1.07  -0.29 / 0.40  -0.51 /1.04  -2.62/5.72 
C. Aggregate Boom Paths         
  Unemployment Rate  0.065  0.064  0.064   
 Monthly Job-Finding Rate  0.43  0.44  0.44   
Mean PV Losses  -0.19  -0.26  -0.12  1.14 
10
th/90
th percentile PV losses  -0.84 / 0.56  -0.39 / -0.11  -0.75 / 0.60  -2.73/5.53 
D. Aggregate Bust Paths         
 Unemployment Rate  0.067  0.07  0.070   
 Monthly Job-Finding Rate  0.43  0.41  0.42   
Mean PV Losses  0.66  0.37  0.59  1.42 
10
th/90
th percentile PV losses  0.02/ 1.38  0.26 / 0.51  -0.08 / 1.35  -2.49/5.87 
99
th percentile PV losses  2.18  0.66  2.20  10.81 
 
Notes to Table 4: 
1.  Table entries report statistics for three versions of the basic Mortensen-Pissarides model of 
equilibrium unemployment.   The two “MP-Nash” versions entail Nash wage bargaining – 
one with a standard calibration similar to Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005), and one with a 
calibration similar to Hagedorn and Manoviski (2008).  The “MP-CB” version is the credible 
bargaining model of Hall and Milgrom (2008), which entails sequential bargaining with 
disagreement costs à la Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).  All calibrations follow 
Hall and Milgrom (2008) in their choice of parameter values and the transition matrix of a 
five-state Markov process for aggregate shocks. 
2.  We calculate the monthly job-finding rate on a day with job-finding rate ∅ as ∅ (1 −   
   
∅)   , assuming 25 job-seeking days per month. 
3.  We compute the present value income losses in Panel A directly from value functions.  For 
each aggregate state, we calculate the difference between the asset value of employment and 
the asset value of unemployment.  We express this difference relative to the asset value of 
employment.  Performing this calculation for the five aggregate states yields the reported 
ranges in Panel A.  All present value calculations reflect discounting at a 5% annual rate. 	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4.  We calculate statistics for the other panels by simulating the indicated model for 1,000 draws 
of the aggregate path, with each draw starting from the middle aggregate state (state 3) and 
evolving according to the aggregate transition matrix.  We simulate each draw for 5,000 
working days, which corresponds to 20 years at 250 working days per year.  We track 
realized paths for 5,000 day-1 job losers and 1,000 day-1 employed persons on each of the 
1,000 aggregate paths. 
5.  For present value income losses, an individual receives the imputed income value of leisure 
if unemployed on a given day, and the annuity value of his wage bargain if employed.  At the 
end of the simulation horizon, we assign each individual the asset value associated with his 
state on day 5,000.  In this way, we obtain a realized income path plus terminal value for 
each individual, which we then use to compute the realized present value income stream for 
an unemployed worker as of day 1.  We express this realized present value as a percent of the 
mean realized income present value of the day-1 employed persons on the same aggregate 
path. We then compute the statistics reported in Panels B through D.  The online appendix 
provides a more detailed description of the simulations and calculations. 
6.  For present value earnings losses, we assign 0 earnings when unemployed and the annuity 
value of the wage bargain when employed.  To focus on present value earnings over a 20-
year horizon comparable to our empirical estimates in Section 3, we set the terminal value to 
0 at the end of the 5,000-day simulation horizon. We then compare the present value of the 
realized earnings paths for individuals who become unemployed on day 1 to the mean 
realized present value earnings paths for 1,000 individuals who remain employed on day 1 on 
the same aggregate path.  Earnings loss statistics are very similar across all three variants of 
the MP model, so we report results only for the MP-CB version.  See the online appendix for 
a more detailed description of the earnings loss simulations and calculations. 
7.  Panel B reports simulation statistics computed over all 1,000 aggregate paths.  For Panels C 
and D, we first rank aggregate paths by the realized mean present value income (or earnings) 
loss.   We then select a subset of paths and calculate the reported statistics.   Panel C 
(Aggregate Boom Paths) considers paths ranked from 90 to 110 by this metric; i.e., the set of 
paths near the 10
th percentile aggregate path.  Panel D considers paths ranked from 890 to 
910.   
 
The remaining panels of Table 4 report statistics on unemployment, job finding, and the 
distribution  of  present  value  income  and  earnings  losses.  To  compute  these  statistics,  we 
simulate aggregate and individual paths.  Specifically, starting in the middle aggregate state, we 
simulate 1,000 aggregate paths for each version of the model, letting each simulation run for 20 
years (5,000 days at 250 working days per year).  Along each aggregate path, we simulate paths 
for large numbers of workers who either lose jobs or remain employed on day 1.  Flow income 
equals the annuity value of the wage bargain when employed and the imputed flow value of 
unemployment  otherwise.    Present  value  income  includes  the  discounted  asset  value  of  the 
individual’s realized terminal state.  To compute the realized income loss for a day-1 job loser, 
we compare the present value of his realized income path to the mean realized present value 	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income for persons who remain employed on day 1 on the same aggregate path. By comparing 
day-1 job losers to persons who remain employed along the same aggregate path, we obtain a 
comparison between the treated (day-1 job losers) and the controls (day-1 employed). 
To compute the realized earnings loss for a day-1 job loser, we compare the present value 
of his realized earnings path over the 20-year horizon to the mean present value of realized 
earnings for individuals living on the same aggregate path who remain employed on day 1. 
Earnings equal the wage when employed and zero when unemployed.  We set the terminal value 
to zero to match the 20-year horizon in our empirical estimates of present value earnings losses.  
Thus, the earnings losses in Table 4 are larger than the corresponding income losses for two 
reasons:  earnings  exclude  the  imputed  income  value  of  unemployment,  and  we  set  terminal 
values to zero in the earnings comparisons. 
Consider the results for the MP-CB model in Panel B.   Averaging over all day-1 job 
losers on all aggregate paths yields an average realized present value income loss of 0.23%.  This 
figure essentially replicates the income loss result for the MP-CB model in Panel A, as it should.   
However,  the  simulation  approach  enables  us  to  compute  the  full  distribution  of  outcomes.  
Continuing to look over all aggregate and individual paths, the 90
th percentile income loss in the 
MP-CB version is only 1.04%, still a rather modest value.  Job losers at the 10
th percentile of the 
distribution experience a gain of 0.51% in present value income.  
Turning to earnings losses, we report results only for the MP-CB version because the 
other two versions yield very similar results.  Mean present value earnings losses are 1.28% in 
the basic MP model – an order of magnitude smaller than the 10.7% figure in the first column 
and first row of Table 1. One potential concern about this earnings loss comparison is that Table 
1 considers losses associated with “job displacement” events, which by design exclude many job 
loss events that involve little or no loss of earnings and income.   So there is a sense in which we 
have compared average job loss outcomes in the basic MP model to bad-case outcomes in the 
data. While we recognize that this argument has some force, we do not find it persuasive.  The 
estimated  earnings  losses  reported  in  Section  3  pertain  to  an  ex  ante  identifiable  group  of 
workers (men, 50 or younger, with 3 or more years of job tenure at firms with 50 or more 
employees), and this group accounts for a large share of U.S. employment.  We would like a 
theoretical model that explains the magnitude and cyclicality of the present value earnings losses 
associated with job loss for this large group of workers. 	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The remaining panels in Table 4 consider selected aggregate paths defined by the mean 
realized present value income or earnings losses.  “Boom” paths are those near the 10
th percentile 
of average losses for day-1 job losers, and “bust” paths are near the 90
th percentile. Mean present 
value income losses remain small along boom and bust paths. Even when we isolate the worst 
1% of individual outcomes along the bust paths, the present value income losses amount to only 
2.2%  in  the  CB  and  standard  Nash  versions  of  the  model  and  only  0.7%  in  the  Hagedorn-
Manavoskii calibration.  In short, the basic MP model cannot produce large welfare losses for 
job losers, even at the extremes of aggregate and individual outcomes.  The model can produce 
large present value earnings losses at the extremes of the distribution of individual outcomes.  
For example, the worst 1% of individual outcomes reported in Panel D yield earnings losses 
comparable to the mean loss reported in Table 1.
23  This result, however, hardly amounts to a 
success for the model. 
Why are the consequences of job loss so modest in the basic MP model?  Two aspects of 
the model deliver the result almost immediately.  First, wages are uniform in the cross section, so 
that unemployment spells are the only source of earnings loss upon job loss.  Second, when 
calibrated to job-finding rates typical of the postwar U.S. experience, expected unemployment 
durations are short, about two or three months. Short unemployment spells coupled with uniform 
wages in the cross section imply small earnings losses associated with job loss.   
The basic MP model also implies a close relationship between the cost of job loss to the 
worker and the vacancy supply condition, as stressed to us by Bob Hall. Given free entry, the 
zero-profit condition for job-creating employers says that the daily vacancy-filling rate times the 
asset value of a filled job equals the daily flow cost of maintaining a vacancy.  JOLTS data imply 
a vacancy-filling rate of about 5% per day. Drawing on Silva and Toledo (2009) and Hagedorn 
and Manovskii (2008), Hall and Milgrom conclude that the daily flow cost of a vacancy is about 
one-half of a worker’s daily output.  Thus, the asset value of a newly filled job for the employer 
is about ten days output generated by a (newly hired) worker.  If employer and worker share 
equally in the surplus generated by a new match, then the worker’s value of transitioning from 
unemployment to employment is also about ten days’ worth of output. In other words, not much 
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23 We could refine the treatment-control comparisons in Table 4 by replicating the employment stability criterion 
used for controls in Section 3.  This type of refinement may make sense in future research.  Given the uniformity of 
wages and the small consequences of job loss in Table 4, however, we do not think the basic MP model can explain 
the evidence on earnings losses or rationalize strong concerns about job loss and unemployment. 	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value is at stake in the creation and destruction of employment relationships in the basic MP 
model.  Richer models in the MP class need not imply such a tight relationship between the cost 
of filling a new job and the surplus value of the average existing job. 
In summary, we draw three conclusions from Table 4 and the related discussion.  First, 
job loss is a rather inconsequential event for individual welfare in the basic MP model, even at 
the  extremes  of  individual  and  aggregate  outcomes.    Second,  the  basic  MP  model  cannot 
rationalize  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  present  value  earnings  losses  associated  with  job 
displacement. Third, although wage rigidity of the form considered by Hall and Milgrom (2008) 
greatly  improves  the  ability  of  the  basic  MP  model  to  explain  aggregate  unemployment 
fluctuations, it does not bring the model closer to the evidence on the magnitude and cyclicality 
of earnings losses associated with job displacement.   
c.  Losses in an MP Model with Job Destruction Spikes and Search on the Job 
Burgess and Turon (2010) depart from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) by introducing 
search on the job, at a cost, and by adopting a different vacancy creation process that gives 
meaning to the concept of a job apart from an employer-worker match. Specifically, they assume 
a finite supply elasticity of potential new job creation each period, so that firms find it optimal to 
re-fill certain jobs left open by departing workers.  Like MP (1994), their model also differs from 
the basic MP model in capturing cross-sectional heterogeneity in match products and surplus 
values. These extensions lead to cross-sectional wage dispersion, a distinction between job flows 
and worker flows and endogenous job destruction spikes in the wake of negative aggregate 
shocks. The model also gives rise to a job ladder that prolongs the recovery of pre-displacement 
earnings for job-losing workers.   
The model is set in continuous time. Idiosyncratic productivity shocks arrive according to 
independent  Poisson  processes,  and  aggregate  productivity,  p,  follows  a  three-state  Markov 
chain. When hit by an idiosyncratic shock, a job draws a new idiosyncratic productivity value in 
the  interval  [− , ],  possibly  higher  or  lower  than  the  previous  value.  Optimizing  behavior 
yields  three  idiosyncratic  productivity  thresholds,  as  shown  in  Figure  11.    If  idiosyncratic 
productivity exceeds S(p) in a filled job, the worker’s net expected gains to search are negative. 
For productivity less than S(p) in a filled job, the worker’s net expected gains to search are 
positive. If the worker finds a vacant job, he quits and the firm decides whether to search for a 
replacement. It does so if idiosyncratic productivity exceeds T(p); otherwise, it lets the job lapse.  	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If a filled job draws a new idiosyncratic productivity value below R(p), the job is destroyed and 
the worker experiences job loss.  As indicated in Figure 11, the productivity thresholds are 
functions of the aggregate state.  A negative shock to p shifts R(p) to the right, triggering a burst 
of  job  destruction.  An  important  implication  of  these  assumptions  is  that  job  losses  due  to 
idiosyncratic shocks occur throughout the distribution of productivities, while job losses due to 





Figure 11.  Idiosyncratic Productivity Thresholds for Job Destruction, Replacement Hiring 
and On-the-Job Search in the Burgess-Turon Model 
 
Table 5 reports statistics for the model of Burgess and Turon. We modify their calibration 
to generate job-finding rates and unemployment spell durations comparable to postwar U.S. 
experience.
24  Rows A and B report results for a period of time corresponding to three months 
with no change in the aggregate state.  The remaining rows involve transitions between states 
and focus on outcomes for workers who lose jobs in the early part of a downturn, roughly 
corresponding to the recessionary spikes in job destruction and job loss seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
All loss calculations pertain to workers who separate in job destruction/job loss events and 
exclude separations that result from search on the job. 
Row A in Table 5 reports present value income and earnings losses for job losers in the 
good, middle and bad aggregate states.  We compute the income losses using differences in 
value functions at each level of the idiosyncratic productivity level,  , then integrate over the 
distribution of   that prevails in the indicated aggregate state to obtain the mean present value 
income losses in Row A.  For earnings losses, we adopt a simulation approach similar to the 
one  used  for  Table  5.    However,  we  now  compare  the  realized  present  value  earnings  of 
workers who lose jobs with a given   to the mean realized present value of earnings among 
workers who remain employed (in the displacement period) at the same value of  .  Once we 
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24 See the online appendix for a version of Table 5 that adopts their calibration, which is meant to match features of 
the British economy from 1964 to 1999.   
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obtain the comparison for each  , we integrate with respect to the appropriate distribution to 
obtain the mean realized present value earnings loss.  As before, we use a 20-year horizon for 
the earnings calculations. The online appendix describes the model simulations and present 
value calculations in detail.   
 
Table 5. Present Value Losses Due to Job Loss in a Mortensen-Pissarides Model with 
Search on the Job, Heterogeneity in Match Values, and Job Destruction Spikes 
Present Value Losses, Percent of Employment Asset Value for Income Losses and  
Percent of Present Value Earnings Over a 20-Year Horizon for Earnings Losses 
   
Aggregate State  Good  Middle  Bad 
A. Mean PV Loss Due to Idiosyncratic 
Shocks that Result in Job Loss 
Income  0.39  0.35  0.32 
Earnings  2.44  2.54  2.71 
B. Quarterly (Monthly) Job Finding Rate  82.5 (44.1)  73.7 (35.9)  64.9 (29.5) 









C. Mean Loss Due to Idiosyncratic Shocks that 
Result in Job Loss, Comparison to Own Past 
0.63  0.57 
 
0.84 
D. Mean Loss Due to Aggregate Shock that Results 
in Job Loss, Comparison to Own Past 
0.25  0.22  0.47 
E. Inflow-Weighted Average of Rows C and D  0.61  0.55  0.80 
F. Mean Loss Due to Idiosyncratic Shocks that 
Result in Job Loss, Comparison to Control Group 
0.35  0.32  0.32 
G. Mean Loss Due to Aggregate Shock that Results 
in Job Loss, Comparison to Control Group 
0  0  0 
H. Inflow-Weighted Average of Rows F and G  0.33  0.30  0.29 
  Present Value Earnings Losses 
I. Mean Loss Due to Idiosyncratic Shocks that 
Result in Job Loss, Comparison to Own Past 
2.85  3.08  3.26 
J. Mean Loss Due to Aggregate Shock that Results 
in Job Loss, Comparison to Own Past 
2.15  2.57  2.57 
K. Inflow-Weighted Average of Rows I and J  2.81  3.05  3.19 
L. Mean Loss Due to Idiosyncratic Shocks that 
Result in Job Loss, Comparison to Control Group 
2.54  2.71  2.71 
M. Mean Loss Due to Aggregate Shock that Results 
in Job Loss, Comparison to Control Group 
0  0  0 
N. Inflow-Weighted Average of Rows L and M  2.39  2.55  2.42 
 
Notes:  
1.  Table entries report statistics for a search and matching model of Burgess and Turon 
(2010).  Their model differs from the basic Mortensen-Pissarides model in capturing 
search on the job, a distinction between job flows and worker flows, heterogeneity in 	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wages and match surplus values, and spikes in aggregate job destruction.  Their model 
also adopts a different vacancy creation process that gives content to the concept of a job 
apart from the employer-worker match.  Job destruction and job loss arise from negative 
aggregate shocks and sufficiently bad idiosyncratic shocks.   
2.  Burgess and Turon set their model in continuous time.  Idiosyncratic productivity shocks 
arrive according to independent Poisson processes, and aggregate productivity follows a 
three-state Markov chain.  Rows A and B report results for a period of time 
corresponding to three months with no change in the aggregate state.  The remaining 
rows involve transitions between states. As in Burgess and Turon, our calculations ignore 
the sluggish dynamics of the match quality distribution in response to an aggregate shock.   
3.  The calibration of Burgess and Turon is meant to match features of the British economy 
from 1964 to 1999.  We depart from their calibration by increasing the arrival rate of 
idiosyncratic shocks (from 0.15 to 0.25) and the efficiency of the matching function 
(from 0.6 to 1.1). These parameter changes yield more rapid flows through the 
unemployment pool and higher monthly job-finding rates, roughly in line with U.S. 
outcomes.  The unemployment rate is 5.2% in the middle state for our calibration.  
4.  Income loss calculations rely on value function comparisons and pertain to workers who 
separate in job destruction/job loss events.  The PV income losses are expressed relative 
to the asset value of employment.  Earnings loss calculations rely on simulated aggregate 
and individual paths over 20-year horizons (80 quarters), where we set earnings to the 
wage if employed and to 0 if unemployed.  The wage when employed depends on the 
aggregate state and the idiosyncratic productivity level of the job.  The PV earnings 
losses are expressed relative to the present value of earnings over a 20-year horizon; i.e., 
we assign a continuation value of 0 at the 20-year horizon in the earnings loss 
calculations.  All loss calculations exclude separations that result from search on the job.   
5.  For “Comparison to Own Past” we calculate losses relative to the job loser’s pre-
displacement employment value evaluated at the old aggregate state, and expressed 
relative to that same employment value.  For “Comparison to Control Group” we instead 
evaluate the employment value at the new aggregate state.  Either way, we evaluate the 
unemployment value at the new aggregate state.  The “Control Group” comparison yields 
zero loss in Row G and M, because all workers in the lower tail of the productivity 
distribution lose their jobs when hit by a negative aggregate productivity shock.  Hence, 
all get the value of unemployment in the new state.  The “Own Past” and “Control 
Group” benchmarks yield the same loss values in Row A because the aggregate state is 
held constant.  See the online appendix for a detailed explanation of the loss calculations 
and the underlying simulations. 
6.  Rows E, H, K and N report inflow-weighted averages of present value losses associated 
with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.  The weights are given by the flow of job losers 
due to idiosyncratic shocks during the quarter the flow of job losers triggered by a 
negative aggregate shock.    
 
Present value income losses due to job loss are larger than in the basic MP model, but 
they remain quite modest – about 0.3% to 0.4% in Row A.  The entries in Rows C through H 
consider job loss events that occur in the quarter when the economy gets hit by a negative 	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aggregate shock.  Job loss events now arise for two reasons.  As before, a flow of negative 
idiosyncratic shocks produces a stream of job loss events.  In addition, the negative aggregate 
shock erases the surplus value of marginal jobs, producing a burst of job destruction and job 
loss.  All workers at jobs below the new, higher destruction threshold R become unemployed in 
the wake of a negative aggregate shock.  That is, for treatment-control comparisons conditional 
on the idiosyncratic productivity value  , all workers below the new destruction threshold are in 
the same position. Thus, we set losses to 0 in Rows G and M.
25 For control group comparisons, 
job loss produces present value income losses of about 0.3% in these “recession” periods (Row 
H). The disproportionate loss of marginal jobs in the wake of a negative aggregate shock pulls 
down the average present value income loss.  So the model of Burgess and Turon does not shed 
much light on why job loss events in recessions are more consequential.   
Turning to earnings, our calibrated version of the Burgess and Turon model produces 
nontrivial present value losses. For a given aggregate state, the losses reported in Row A range 
from 2.4% to 2.7% of present value earnings.  These losses amount to about one quarter of the 
empirical present value earnings losses reported in Tables 1 and 2. Thus, search on the job and 
heterogeneity in match surplus values clearly helps move the model closer to the evidence on 
the present value earnings losses associated with job loss.   
In this respect, the job ladder feature of the model plays an important role.  The online 
appendix  displays  the  cross-sectional  wage  function,  the  density  of  all  filled  jobs,  and  the 
density  of  first  jobs  for  newly  re-employed  workers  who  leave  unemployment.    For  our 
calibrated version of the model, the maximum wage in the good aggregate state exceeds the 
minimum wage by 49%.  The density of first jobs is much more concentrated at the low end of 
the wage distribution than the density of all jobs.  The average difference between the pre-
displacement  wage  and  the  wage  on  the  first  post-displacement  job  is  10%  in  the  good 
aggregate state, 8.4% in the middle state and 6.7% in the bad state.  These observations and 
statistics are different ways of saying that the model incorporates a significant job ladder. 
A few additional remarks are in order. First, in generating the results for Table 5, we do 
not impose a job tenure requirement on for displaced workers or control group workers.  Doing 
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25 In practice, empirical treatment-control comparisons do not perfectly condition on the idiosyncratic component of 
jobs and match values.  However, as long as the empirical specification at least partly captures a disproportionate 
loss of marginal jobs in the wake of a negative aggregate shock, the composition effect we highlight here will also 
be present in the empirical estimates of earnings losses associated with job loss in a recession. 	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so may increase the earnings losses.  Second, search intensity is a binary decision variable in 
the  model  of  Burgess  and  Turon.  Variable  search  intensity  for  employed  workers,  as  in 
Hertweck (2010), may generate an elongated climb up the job ladder after displacement and, as 
a result, produce larger present value earnings losses.
26 We conclude that job ladder models can 
produce nontrivial earnings losses due to job displacement but are unlikely to account for the 
bulk of the empirical losses.  For one thing, they do not explain why the earnings of displaced 
workers remain well below that of control group workers 10 or more years after displacement.  
Moreover, it does not appear that a pure job ladder model can rationalize the striking cyclical 
pattern in the present value earnings losses that we documented in Section 3.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
High-tenure workers who lose jobs in mass-layoff events experience large and persistent 
earnings losses compared to otherwise similar workers who retain their jobs.  That is the central 
message of a now-sizable literature on the earnings losses associated with job displacement. 
We focus on displacements from 1980 to 2005 among men 50 or younger with 3 or more years 
of prior job tenure. For this group, job loss in mass-layoff events reduces present value earnings 
by an estimated $77,557 (2000 dollars) over 20 years at a 5% annual discount rate, equivalent 
to 1.7 years of pre-displacement earnings.  Losses are larger for men with greater job tenure.  
They are smaller for women, even as a multiple of pre-displacement earnings.   
Present value losses rise steeply with the unemployment rate at the time of displacement. 
The  average  loss  equals  1.4  years  of  pre-displacement  earnings  if  unemployment  at 
displacement is less than 6%, and 2.8 years if unemployment exceeds 8%.  More generally, the 
evidence  in  Tables  1  and  2  and  Figures  5  to  7  says  that  tight  labor  market  conditions  at 
displacement  strongly  improve  the  medium-  and  long-term  future  earnings  prospects  of 
displaced  workers.  The  highly  pro-cyclical  behavior  of  job-finding  rates  among  the 
unemployed implies that tight labor market conditions strengthen near-term re-employment and 
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26 Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) consider a different model with search on the job and productivity heterogeneity 
on both sides of the labor market. Employers have all the bargaining power, and newly re-employed workers start 
at the bottom of the wage distribution after an unemployment spell. When an employed worker finds an attractive 
outside opportunity, the incumbent employer may respond with a successful counter offer, i.e., a wage increase.  
Thus, the model of Postel-Vinay and Robin also yields a prolonged earnings recovery path after job loss that is 
tied to search on the job, but wage gains may or may not coincide with job changes.   
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earnings prospects as well.  Seen in this light, economic policies that set the stage for strong 
growth and low unemployment are highly beneficial to displaced workers.  Indeed, pro-growth 
policies  may  be  the  most  efficient  and  cost-effective  means  available  to  policymakers  to 
alleviate the hardships experienced by displaced workers.   
Previous  work  shows  that  job  displacement  also  has  negative  consequences  for 
employment and earnings stability, household consumption expenditures, health and mortality 
outcomes, children’s achievement, and subjective wellbeing.  We present evidence that worker 
perceptions about layoff risks, job-finding prospects, and the likelihood of wage cuts closely 
track cyclical fluctuations in actual labor market conditions.  Perception measures point to a 
tremendous increase in worker anxieties about labor market prospects after the financial crisis 
of 2008, an increase that persists through August 2011.  It seems likely that these high anxiety 
levels produce important stresses and psychological costs for a large segment of the population. 
We also consider whether models of unemployment fluctuations along the lines of the 
canonical contribution by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) can account for the earnings losses 
associated with job displacement. Basic versions of the MP model featured in much recent 
research imply theoretical earnings losses an order of magnitude smaller than empirical losses. 
The explanation is straightforward. The basic model has uniform wages in the cross section 
and, when calibrated to U.S. job-finding rates, short unemployment spells.  Thus, job loss has 
little  impact  on  present  value  earnings.    Because  so  little  is  at  stake  in  the  destruction  of 
employment  relationships  in  the  basic  MP  model,  it  cannot  rationalize  the  earnings  losses 
associated with job displacement.   
Lastly, we evaluate an MP model of Burgess and Turon (2010) with search on the job 
and replacement hiring. Unlike the basic MP model, the model of Burgess and Turon is at least 
qualitatively  consistent  with  several  first-order  features  of  the  data:  cross-sectional  wage 
dispersion, worker flows in excess of job flows, and recessionary spikes in job destruction and 
unemployment  inflows.  The  model  also  exhibits  a  job  ladder  that  prolongs  the  earnings 
recovery path after displacement.  When calibrated to match U.S. job-finding rates, job loss in 
the model produces present value earnings losses that, on average, are about one quarter of the 
mean empirical losses due to job displacement. This is a sizable improvement over the basic 
MP model, but it leaves a very large gap between theory and evidence.  Moreover, the model 	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cannot  explain  larger  losses  for  displacements  that  occur  in  recessions,  because  negative 
aggregate shocks trigger the destruction of lower value jobs. 
In our view, a major shortcoming of existing MP models of unemployment fluctuations is 
their implication that job loss is a rather inconsequential event for the affected workers. The 
consequences of job displacement, and fears of displacement, are among the main reasons that 
recessions and high unemployment create so much concern in the general population.  The 
negative consequences of job displacement are why unemployment is such a potent political 
issue.    We  also  think  the  consequential  nature  of  job  displacement  is  a  major  reason  that 
unemployment and unemployment fluctuations attract so much attention from economists.   
It is important to put our criticism of MP models in proper context.  We see MP models, 
in particular, and the larger class of DMP models as a great advance. These models deliver a 
coherent theory of frictional unemployment and its determinants. They provide an analytical 
framework for studying cyclical movements in unemployment, vacancies, job-finding rates, 
and the joint dynamics of workers flows and job flows. They provide tools for analyzing search 
and matching behavior by employers and job seekers, and for studying the implications of 
search and matching frictions for wage dispersion and individual wage dynamics. These tools 
are widely used to study the effects of policies, wage-setting arrangements and other economic 
institutions on unemployment and a variety of other labor market outcomes.    
We  hope  to  see  these  models  taken  in  directions  that  can  explain  large  and  lasting 
earnings  losses  at  job  displacement.  There  are  potentially  several  ways  to  bring  MP-type 
models closer to the evidence on the earnings losses associated with job displacement. Learning 
about match quality over time as in Jovanovic (1979), the acquisition of specific skills through 
learning-by-doing on the job, and investments in specific training as in Becker (1962) can yield 
substantial earnings losses at job loss. These three mechanisms influence match durability and 
the  evolution  of  surplus  values  in  ongoing  matches.  It  would  be  useful  to  integrate  these 
mechanisms into MP models of unemployment fluctuations, which have thus far devoted much 
greater  attention  to  the  forces  governing  match  formation.  Topel  (1990)  and  Neal  (1995), 
among others, argue that specific forms of human capital play a central role in determining the 
magnitude of earnings losses associated with job displacement. Ljungvist and Sargent (1998) 
build an equilibrium search model that hard wires a link between job loss and the destruction of 
human capital, and that includes further human capital depreciation during unemployment. 	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Workers may also enjoy rents for reasons apart from search and matching frictions and 
returns on specific human capital. Explanations for worker rents include fairness norms and 
concerns about pay equity (Akerlof and Yellen, 1982), high pay as a device to deter shirking 
(Bulow and Summers, 1986), the appropriation of quasi-rents generated by sunk investments 
(Grout, 1986 and Caballero and Hammour, 2005), and worker sharing of product market rents. 
Beaudry  and  DiNardo  (1992)  stress  the  role  of  long-term  contracting  and  one-sided 
commitment as a source of downward wage stickiness. Schmieder and von Wachter (2010) 
consider workers who receive higher wages due to tight labor market conditions in the past.  
They  find  evidence  that  these  workers  experience  higher  layoff  rates  and  lose  their  wage 
premiums upon job loss, a pattern of results that supports the presence of rents. Whether this 
pattern  accounts  for  larger  earnings  losses  in  recessions,  when  displacements  are  more 
widespread, is an open question.  
Workers who enter the labor market in periods of slack conditions suffer negative effects 
on future earnings that persist for ten years or more (e.g., Kahn, 2010).  Both lasting declines in 
employer  quality  and  lasting  effects  of  low  starting  wages  on  wage  growth  within  firms 
contribute  to  the  persistent  negative  earnings  effects  of  slack  conditions  at  entry  (e.g., 
Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz, 2010).  These results are interesting, in part, because new 
entrants have not accumulated job-specific rents and are unlikely to have accumulated much in 
the way of specific human capital.  Apparently, weak conditions at the time of labor market 
entry slow the accumulation of rents and specific human capital for many years thereafter. 
Similar  forces  could  lower  the  future  earnings  prospects  of  workers  who  are  displaced  in 
recessions and slumps. 
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 ﾠOnline	 ﾠAppendix	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A. 	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdditional	 ﾠEmpirical	 ﾠResults	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠA1:	 ﾠAnnual	 ﾠEarnings	 ﾠLosses	 ﾠBy	 ﾠAge	 ﾠat	 ﾠDisplacement,	 ﾠMen	 ﾠwith	 ﾠat	 ﾠLeast	 ﾠ3	 ﾠYears	 ﾠ




Note:	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ5A	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠA3:	 ﾠPresent	 ﾠValue	 ﾠEarnings	 ﾠLosses	 ﾠBy	 ﾠAge	 ﾠat	 ﾠDisplacement,	 ﾠExpressed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
Multiple	 ﾠof	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠAnnual	 ﾠPre-ﾭ‐Displacement	 ﾠEarnings	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFour	 ﾠYears	 ﾠPrior	 ﾠto	 ﾠ




Note:	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠto	 ﾠTables	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠA.3.	 ﾠPerceived	 ﾠLikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠor	 ﾠLayoff	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNext	 ﾠ12	 ﾠMonths,	 ﾠ





1.  See	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ8	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.  This	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ18-ﾭ‐64	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠage,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
considers	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠto	 ﾠprime	 ﾠage	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ25-ﾭ‐54	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠage.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Slope=1.14	 ﾠ(s.e.=.20)	 ﾠ
Intercept=3.95	 ﾠ(s.e.=1.33)	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠA.4.	 ﾠPerceived	 ﾠDifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠJob	 ﾠFinding,	 ﾠAll	 ﾠAvailable	 ﾠYears	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠ





1.  See	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ9	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.  This	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ18-ﾭ‐64	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠage,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
considers	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠto	 ﾠprime	 ﾠage	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ25-ﾭ‐54	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠage.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Slope=3.61	 ﾠ(s.e.=.47)	 ﾠ
Intercept=17.48	 ﾠ(s.e.=3.14)	 ﾠ
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B. 	 ﾠModel	 ﾠSimulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠCalculations	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠModel	 ﾠof	 ﾠHall	 ﾠand	 ﾠMilgrom	 ﾠ(Table	 ﾠ4)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ




!i, i' "(#i)(Wi' +Vi')+ 1!"(#i) ( )Ui' " # $ %
i' & ,	 ﾠ
where:	 ﾠ
ﾧ  z	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠleisure	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠnonmarket	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠinclusive	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ
ﾧ  r	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdaily	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠ
ﾧ  !("i)is	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdaily	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐finding	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠfor	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠin	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
i,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvacancy-ﾭ‐unemployment	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ! 	 ﾠ
ﾧ  !i, i' 	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdaily	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransitioning	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate	 ﾠi	 ﾠto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠi',	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Wi is	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworker’s	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠbargain	 ﾠin	 ﾠstate	 ﾠi.	 ﾠ




!i, i' (1!s)Vi' +sUi' [ ]
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 ﾠ
where	 ﾠs	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdaily	 ﾠrate	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠjobs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠwi be	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠbargain	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠworker	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠi.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠsolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠequations,	 ﾠ




i' " , for i =1,...,5.
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠmatrix	 ﾠnotation,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠwrite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvector	 ﾠof	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠas	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 61	 ﾠ












	 ﾠ For	 ﾠPanel	 ﾠA	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠand	 ﾠcalculate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ










Each	 ﾠentry	 ﾠin	 ﾠPanel	 ﾠA	 ﾠreports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠloss	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstates	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠand	 ﾠcalibration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠpanels	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPanel	 ﾠA	 ﾠtells	 ﾠus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmean	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠincome	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠstates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠand	 ﾠcalibration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPartly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sake	 ﾠof	 ﾠbrevity,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠall	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠloss	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
1.  Set	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠi=3,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
2.  Draw	 ﾠ1,000	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠdaily	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠmatrix	 ﾠ!.	 ﾠLet	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ
path	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ5,000	 ﾠdays,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcorresponds	 ﾠto	 ﾠ20	 ﾠyears	 ﾠat	 ﾠ250	 ﾠdays	 ﾠper	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠalong	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
evolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdaily	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐finding	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ!("i).	 ﾠ
3.  On	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath,	 ﾠtrack	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠincome	 ﾠflows	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ5,000	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠwho	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
unemployed	 ﾠon	 ﾠday	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠday	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠ!("i)and	 ﾠs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠindividual’s	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠflows	 ﾠare	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 62	 ﾠ
Flowi,t =
wi,t, if employed at t in state i;





4.  At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterminal	 ﾠdate	 ﾠT=5,000,	 ﾠassign	 ﾠeach	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠWi +Vi 	 ﾠif	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠor	 ﾠUi if	 ﾠunemployed.	 ﾠ
5.  Compute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠday-ﾭ‐1	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠincome	 ﾠpath	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlose	 ﾠ
jobs	 ﾠon	 ﾠday	 ﾠ1	 ﾠas	 ﾠ




















where	 ﾠAi, T 	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterminal	 ﾠasset	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual’s	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠstatus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6.  The	 ﾠforegoing	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ5,000	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠ ! U(Income, Day 1)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠpath.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠincome	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠjob	 ﾠ
loss,	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployment,	 ﾠare	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
R_Inc_Loss =100








where	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠare	 ﾠevaluated	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠi=3.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ The	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠincome	 ﾠloss	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ4	 ﾠreport	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
individual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠR_Inc_Loss	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠ(Panel	 ﾠB)	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠ(Panels	 ﾠC	 ﾠto	 ﾠD).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠpanels	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreport	 ﾠmean	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonthly	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐finding	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠloss	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ	 ﾠSteps	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠas	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠStep	 ﾠ3	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠthat	 ﾠz=0.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠStep	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠset	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
terminal	 ﾠasset	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ0	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠhorizons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmodify	 ﾠStep	 ﾠ5	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 63	 ﾠ













where flowi,t(z = 0)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠpath	 ﾠof	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ
Along	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsimulate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ1,000	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠremain	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠon	 ﾠday	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠday-ﾭ‐1	 ﾠjob	 ﾠlosers,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
calculate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠhorizon,	 ﾠ












where,	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠ flowi,t(z = 0)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠpath	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠcompute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠover	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠon	 ﾠDay	 ﾠ1	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠE(Earnings, Day 1)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠone	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠE(Earnings, Day 1)and	 ﾠ5,000	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
! U(Earnings, Day 1)for	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath.	 ﾠ
Lastly,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcompute	 ﾠa	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠloss	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠstep	 ﾠ6	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠ
R_Earn_Loss =100








Table	 ﾠ4	 ﾠreports	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠR_Earn_Loss	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠ(Panel	 ﾠB)	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠ(Panels	 ﾠC	 ﾠand	 ﾠD).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠModel	 ﾠof	 ﾠBurgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuron	 ﾠ(Table	 ﾠ5)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠbefore,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcalculate	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠincome	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠjob	 ﾠloss	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠasset	 ﾠvalues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcalculate	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠ
horizon,	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠover	 ﾠ20	 ﾠyears.	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Before	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimulation	 ﾠdetails,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
calculate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLet	 ﾠ f
p(!)	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠin	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠp,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ! 	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠvalue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlet	 ﾠF
p 	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠ
distribution	 ﾠfunction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFollowing	 ﾠBurgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuron,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠignore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshort-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
f
p(!)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠcalculate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“stationary”	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprevails	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠremains	 ﾠ
constant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEmployers	 ﾠand	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstochastic	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠ
governing	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠand	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠ shifts	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproductivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstochastic	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
environment	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcreation,	 ﾠrecruitment,	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠwages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Burgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuron	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwages	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠp	 ﾠand	 ﾠ .	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠE
p(!;z,T)	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠincome	 ﾠor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠflows	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠa	 ﾠworker	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠwith	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠ! 	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEvaluatingE
p(!;z,T)	 ﾠat	 ﾠz	 ﾠ=	 ﾠincome	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠleisure	 ﾠand	 ﾠT=!	 ﾠyields	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEvaluating	 ﾠat	 ﾠz=0	 ﾠand	 ﾠT=80	 ﾠquarters	 ﾠyields	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠhorizon.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠU
p(z,T)is	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠincome	 ﾠor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠworker	 ﾠin	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ
Panel	 ﾠA	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5	 ﾠreports	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠloss	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood,	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠand	 ﾠBad	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠ
Panel A:    E
p(!;z,T)!U
p(z,T) " # $ %/E
p(!;z,T) { } & f
p(!)d!, 	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠp	 ﾠindexes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠz	 ﾠand	 ﾠT	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
loss	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠor	 ﾠearnings,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠloss	 ﾠcalculations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
F
p
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relevantE
p(!)	 ﾠand	 ﾠU
p	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠare	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠfunctions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠloss	 ﾠcalculations,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
construct	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠE
p(!)	 ﾠand	 ﾠU
p	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠby	 ﾠsimulating	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠ
earnings	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠas	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠPanel	 ﾠA	 ﾠcalculation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠloss	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠjob	 ﾠloss	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworker’s	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐displacement	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠ(own	 ﾠ
past)	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠremain	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠ! 	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐displacement	 ﾠjob	 ﾠ(control	 ﾠgroup).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠbenchmarks	 ﾠ–	 ﾠown	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ–	 ﾠyield	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠloss	 ﾠcalculation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Rows	 ﾠC	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠN	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5	 ﾠreport	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
workers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlose	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwake	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠshock	 ﾠto	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproductivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJob	 ﾠ
destruction	 ﾠand	 ﾠjob	 ﾠloss	 ﾠnow	 ﾠarise	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(sufficiently)	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠ
productivity	 ﾠshocks,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠPanel	 ﾠA,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠshock	 ﾠgenerates	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
burst	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠdestruction	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatch	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠdistribution.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
describe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood(G)	 ﾠto	 ﾠMiddle(M)	 ﾠtransition;	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
wake	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠshock	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGood	 ﾠto	 ﾠMiddle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnalogous	 ﾠ
calculations	 ﾠhold	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood￠Bad	 ﾠand	 ﾠMiddle￠Bad	 ﾠtransitions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠloss	 ﾠ
expressions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood￠Middle	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠare	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Panel C and I:    E
G(!;z,T)!U
M(z,T) " # $ %/E
G(!;z,T) { } & f
G(!)d!,
	 ﾠ
Panel D and J:   F











Panel F and L:    E
M(!;z,T)!U
M(z,T) " # $ %/E
M(!;z,T) { } & f
M(!)d!,
	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠR(p)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠdestruction	 ﾠthreshold	 ﾠin	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠstate	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 66	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPanels	 ﾠC	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠPV	 ﾠloss	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠown	 ﾠpast	 ﾠPV	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood	 ﾠstate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlose	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
idiosyncratic	 ﾠshocks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPanels	 ﾠD	 ﾠand	 ﾠJ	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠPV	 ﾠloss	 ﾠfor	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠburst	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠdestruction	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ
productivity	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGood	 ﾠto	 ﾠMiddle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠshock	 ﾠdestroys	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
jobs	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ! ![R(G),R(M)].	 ﾠPanels	 ﾠD	 ﾠand	 ﾠJ	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPV	 ﾠloss	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworker’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
past	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPanels	 ﾠF	 ﾠand	 ﾠL	 ﾠgive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
mean	 ﾠPV	 ﾠloss	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐losing	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠof	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠremain	 ﾠ
employed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood￠Middle	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Panels	 ﾠF	 ﾠand	 ﾠL	 ﾠis	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠstate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPanel	 ﾠA.1	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ! ![R(G),R(M)]	 ﾠlose	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠtransitions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGood	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Middle,	 ﾠPanels	 ﾠG	 ﾠand	 ﾠM	 ﾠreport	 ﾠzero	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrols.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠ
Panels	 ﾠE,	 ﾠH,	 ﾠK	 ﾠand	 ﾠN	 ﾠreport	 ﾠinflow-ﾭ‐weighted	 ﾠaverages	 ﾠof	 ﾠPV	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
types	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠdestruction	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠand	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠ
idiosyncratic	 ﾠshocks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquarterly	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠand	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠcalibration,	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠ
shocks	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐loss	 ﾠevents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠloss	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
1.  Set	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠGood,	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠor	 ﾠBad.	 ﾠ
2.  Draw	 ﾠ2,000	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠmatrix	 ﾠfor	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLet	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ






and	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐finding	 ﾠprobability.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠWe	 ﾠintegrate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠ f
M(!)in	 ﾠPanels	 ﾠF	 ﾠand	 ﾠL	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ f
G(!), but	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠ
little	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults.	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3.  Partition	 ﾠ[!!,!],the	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ200	 ﾠsubintervals	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
equal	 ﾠlength.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠquarter	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath,	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠ1,000	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠ
persons	 ﾠand	 ﾠ100	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠper	 ﾠsubinterval	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠF
p(!).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠof	 ﾠF
p(!)covers	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ150	 ﾠsubintervals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.  Follow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠand	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠforward	 ﾠin	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ80-ﾭ‐quarter	 ﾠduration	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTrack	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠ
earnings	 ﾠpath	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstochastic	 ﾠarrival	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsearching	 ﾠand	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
employed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTrack	 ﾠand	 ﾠstore	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠpath,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠ
equal	 ﾠw(p,!)	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠand	 ﾠ0	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠunemployed.	 ﾠ
5.  Consider	 ﾠall	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠalong	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠsimulation	 ﾠpath.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Calculate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠPV	 ﾠof	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠand	 ﾠeach	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠ
employed	 ﾠperson	 ﾠliving	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCompute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠPV	 ﾠover	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠ
unemployed	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠU




Plug	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintegral	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠabove	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
desired	 ﾠPV	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠloss	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpath.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6.  Repeat	 ﾠStep	 ﾠ5	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠand	 ﾠcompute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠmean	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPV	 ﾠloss	 ﾠ
expressions	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠremarked	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcalibration	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5	 ﾠdeparts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Burgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuron	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐finding	 ﾠrates	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
decades.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠTable	 ﾠB1	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠreports	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcalibration	 ﾠof	 ﾠBurgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuron.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentries	 ﾠin	 ﾠPanel	 ﾠB,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 68	 ﾠ
Burgess-ﾭ‐Turon	 ﾠcalibration	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlower	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐finding	 ﾠrates	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠones	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPV	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠjob	 ﾠloss	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
substantially	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBurgess-ﾭ‐Turon	 ﾠcalibration.	 ﾠ
Section	 ﾠ5.C	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐
displacement	 ﾠwage	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐displacement	 ﾠjob	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlose	 ﾠ
jobs	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠshocks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcalculate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠ
unemployed	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠin	 ﾠStep	 ﾠ4	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠstore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐displacement	 ﾠjob.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Compute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwage	 ﾠover	 ﾠall	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠpaths,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcall	 ﾠit	 ﾠw1
p.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠwage-ﾭ‐change	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreport	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠis	 ﾠ1! w1
p /w(p,!) " # $ % & f
p(!)d!.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Figure	 ﾠB1	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠjobs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠexit	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠafter	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Burgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuron.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠis	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
calibration	 ﾠas	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWages	 ﾠin	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠvary	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ0.79	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1.16.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠseen	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdashed	 ﾠand	 ﾠsolid	 ﾠred	 ﾠlines,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠ
jobs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠjob	 ﾠlosers	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlow	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠjobs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠillustrates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠladder	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Following	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠloss	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠnewly	 ﾠreemployed	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠstart	 ﾠnear	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbottom	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
job	 ﾠladder	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠladder	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob.	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠB1.	 ﾠPresent	 ﾠValue	 ﾠLosses	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠModel	 ﾠof	 ﾠBurgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuron	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠCalibration	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Present	 ﾠValue	 ﾠLosses,	 ﾠPercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠEmployment	 ﾠAsset	 ﾠValue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠLosses	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Percent	 ﾠof	 ﾠPresent	 ﾠValue	 ﾠEarnings	 ﾠOver	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐Year	 ﾠHorizon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEarnings	 ﾠLosses	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Aggregate	 ﾠState	 ﾠ Good	 ﾠ Middle	 ﾠ Bad	 ﾠ
A.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠPV	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠIdiosyncratic	 ﾠ
Shocks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠResult	 ﾠin	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠ
Income	 ﾠ 0.62	 ﾠ 0.58	 ﾠ 0.53	 ﾠ
Earnings	 ﾠ 4.38	 ﾠ 4.68	 ﾠ 4.98	 ﾠ
B.	 ﾠQuarterly	 ﾠ(Monthly)	 ﾠJob	 ﾠFinding	 ﾠRate	 ﾠ 39.4	 ﾠ(15.4)	 ﾠ 35.3	 ﾠ(13.5)	 ﾠ 31.5	 ﾠ(11.9)	 ﾠ









C.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠIdiosyncratic	 ﾠShocks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Result	 ﾠin	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss,	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠOwn	 ﾠPast	 ﾠ
0.84	 ﾠ 0.77	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.04	 ﾠ
D.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠAggregate	 ﾠShock	 ﾠthat	 ﾠResults	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss,	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠOwn	 ﾠPast	 ﾠ
0.23	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ 0.43	 ﾠ
E.	 ﾠInflow-ﾭ‐Weighted	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠRows	 ﾠC	 ﾠand	 ﾠD	 ﾠ 0.78	 ﾠ 0.72	 ﾠ 0.94	 ﾠ
F.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠIdiosyncratic	 ﾠShocks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Result	 ﾠin	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss,	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠControl	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ
0.58	 ﾠ 0.53	 ﾠ 0.53	 ﾠ
G.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠAggregate	 ﾠShock	 ﾠthat	 ﾠResults	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss,	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠControl	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ
H.	 ﾠInflow-ﾭ‐Weighted	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠRows	 ﾠF	 ﾠand	 ﾠG	 ﾠ 0.52	 ﾠ 0.48	 ﾠ 0.44	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Present	 ﾠValue	 ﾠEarnings	 ﾠLosses	 ﾠ
I.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠIdiosyncratic	 ﾠShocks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Result	 ﾠin	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss,	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠOwn	 ﾠPast	 ﾠ
5.44	 ﾠ 5.80	 ﾠ 6.09	 ﾠ
J.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠAggregate	 ﾠShock	 ﾠthat	 ﾠResults	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss,	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠOwn	 ﾠPast	 ﾠ
4.48	 ﾠ 5.10	 ﾠ 5.23	 ﾠ
K.	 ﾠInflow-ﾭ‐Weighted	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠRows	 ﾠI	 ﾠand	 ﾠJ	 ﾠ 5.34	 ﾠ 5.73	 ﾠ 5.95	 ﾠ
L.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠIdiosyncratic	 ﾠShocks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Result	 ﾠin	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss,	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠControl	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ
4.68	 ﾠ 4.98	 ﾠ 4.98	 ﾠ
M.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠAggregate	 ﾠShock	 ﾠthat	 ﾠResults	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss,	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠControl	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ




Average	 ﾠRelative	 ﾠWage	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠIdiosyncratic	 ﾠ
Shocks	 ﾠThat	 ﾠResult	 ﾠin	 ﾠJob	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠ
5.17	 ﾠ 4.00	 ﾠ 4.58	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Notes:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtable	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcalibration	 ﾠof	 ﾠBurgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuron,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠjob-ﾭ‐finding	 ﾠ
rates.	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠB1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWage	 ﾠFunction	 ﾠand	 ﾠDensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠFilled	 ﾠJobs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠModel	 ﾠof	 ﾠBurgess	 ﾠand	 ﾠ





1.  The	 ﾠbold	 ﾠblack	 ﾠline	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠ
value, ,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.  The	 ﾠsolid	 ﾠred	 ﾠline	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGood	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ
state.	 ﾠ
3.  The	 ﾠdashed	 ﾠline	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐displacement	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
workers	 ﾠleaving	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠafter	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠformer	 ﾠjobs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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